New Phase in Syria Crisis: Dealmaking Toward An Exit Wednesday, Mar 21 2012 

Arab Awakening and Foreign Affairs and Middle East and Syria and United Nations and US Foreign Policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 9:01 pm

By Sharmine Narwani

In recent weeks, there has been a notable shuffle in the positions of key external players in the Syrian crisis. Momentum has quite suddenly shifted from an all-out onslaught against the Assad government to a quiet investigation of exit strategies.

The clashes between government forces and opposition militias in Baba Amr were a clear tipping point for these players – much hinged on the outcome of that battle. Today, the retreat of armed groups from the Homs neighborhood means one thing: the strategy of militarizing the conflict from within is no longer a plausible option on which to hang this geopolitical battle. Especially not in an American or French election year, when anything less than regime change in Syria will look like abject failure.

And so the external players are shifting gears – the more outspoken ones, quietly seeking alternative options. There are two de facto groups that have formed. Group A is looking for a face-saving exit from the promised escalation in Syria. It consists of the United States, European Union and Turkey. Group B, on the other hand, is heavily invested in regime-change at any cost, and includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar and some elements of the French, US, British and Libyan establishments.

Before Baba Amr, these two groups were unified in maximizing their every resource to force regime change in Syria. When the UN Security Council option was blocked by Russia and China, they coalesced around the General Assembly and ad-hoc “Friends of Syria” to build coalitions, tried unsuccessfully to bring a disparate opposition fighting force (Free Syrian Army) under central leadership, pushed to recognize the disunited Syrian National Council (SNC), and eked out weekly “events” like embassy closures and political condemnations to maintain a “perception momentum.”

But those efforts have largely come to a standstill after Baba Amr. A reliable source close to the Syrian regime said to me recently: “The regime eliminated the biggest and most difficult obstacle – Baba Amr. Elsewhere, it (eliminating armed militias) is easier and less costly at all levels. Now both political and military steps can continue.” (more…)

 

Veteran US Diplomat Questions Syria Storyline Friday, Feb 10 2012 

Arab Awakening and Foreign Affairs and Media and Middle East and Syria and US Foreign Policy and US Politics , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 3:52 pm

By Sharmine Narwani

The problem with US policy in the Middle East is that it now operates almost entirely at the political level: gone are the days when area experts were the heavyweights in the command center, weaving historical context, relationships and nuance into vital policy decisions.

Today you are more likely to have single-issue interest groups, commercial projects and election cycles impact key deliberations. It’s a short-term view: tactical more than strategic and black and white in its approach. Like a high-octane marketing campaign, it is heavily focused on key phrases, scene-setting, and narrative building.

The spotlight on Syria in recent weeks has been intense and the propaganda has been incessant: Regime massacres in Homs, evil Russia and China, a benevolent UN Security Council trying to save Syria, 1982′s Hama slaughter resuscitated, and an American ambassador left “disgusted” at the gall of others using veto power.

But take the hysteria down a notch or two, bring the debate back into the hands of measured, experienced observers, and the storyline may be tangibly different. Over the weekend, I had the privilege of receiving an email that reminded me of a time when area experts at the US State Department delivered honest assessments of events so that wiser decisions could be taken.

The missive was from a former US diplomat with service experience in Syria who has asked to remain unnamed. I am publishing the email below in its entirety for the benefit of readers:

“I have serious problems with all the talk about military intervention in Syria. Everyone, especially the media, seems to be relying solely on anti-regime activists for their information. How do we know 260 people were killed by the regime in Homs yesterday? That number seems based solely on claims by anti-regime figures and I seriously doubt its accuracy.

I served over three years in Damascus at the US Embassy and I know how difficult it is to sort fact from rumor in that closed political society. We were constantly trying to verify rumors that we had heard about assassinations, regime arrests, etc., and that included the Agency, which was just as much in the dark as everyone else. Today, we have a skeleton embassy which I am sure is under constant surveillance and with very few personnel to go out and report on what is happening. When I was in Damascus over two years ago, I was less than impressed with the Embassy’s sources and with its understanding of the dynamics of what was going on Syria. And the same is true when I talk to officials at the State Department. (more…)

 

Octavia, Frances, and the Late, Great, Ayatollah Fadlallah Wednesday, Oct 27 2010 

Foreign Affairs and Hezbollah and Lebanon and Middle East , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 3:14 pm

Fadlallah pictured in the background as mourners make their way toward his funeral procession

“Sad to hear of the passing of Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. One of Hezbollah’s giants I respect a lot.” And so this is how an 86-letter Tweet ended the career of CNN’s veteran Middle East editor Octavia Nasr.

 

I grew up watching Octavia on the then-fledgling CNN, Ted Turner’s groundbreaking twenty-four hour cable news channel that brought the Intifada and Tiananmen Square into our homes, every half hour, around the clock.

To think an illustrious career could come undone because of respect paid to the “intellect and passion” of Ayatollah Fadlallah, “a surprisingly progressive thinker.” Oh, I didn’t say that. David Ignatius of the Washington Post did after his 2002 and 2004 interviews with the senior Shiite cleric in Lebanon.

Fire him too then.

An Israeli foreign ministry official quoted on Ynet thinks the fate of British Ambassador to Lebanon Frances Guy should be “interesting” to watch. Why? Because Ambassador Guy also thinks well of Fadlallah — so well in fact, that she paid a moving tribute to him on her personal blog on the Foreign Office’s website. A posting that was promptly removed a few days later.

In case you didn’t see the touching eulogy, here is what the highly respected British career diplomat had to say about the late cleric whose progressive influence pervaded the Mideast and beyond:

“One of the privileges of being a diplomat is the people you meet; great and small, passionate and furious. People in Lebanon like to ask me which politician I admire most. It is an unfair question, obviously, and many are seeking to make a political response of their own. I usually avoid answering by referring to those I enjoy meeting the most and those that impress me the most. Until yesterday my preferred answer was to refer to Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, head of the Shia clergy in Lebanon and much admired leader of many Shia muslims throughout the world. When you visited him you could be sure of a real debate, a respectful argument and you knew you would leave his presence feeling a better person. That for me is the real effect of a true man of religion; leaving an impact on everyone he meets, no matter what their faith. Sheikh Fadlallah passed away yesterday. Lebanon is a lesser place the day after but his absence will be felt well beyond Lebanon’s shores. I remember well when I was nominated ambassador to Beirut, a muslim acquaintance sought me out to tell me how lucky I was because I would get a chance to meet Sheikh Fadlallah. Truly he was right. If I was sad to hear the news I know other peoples’ lives will be truly blighted. The world needs more men like him willing to reach out across faiths, acknowledging the reality of the modern world and daring to confront old constraints. May he rest in peace.”

In case you’re wondering, the British Foreign Office sent me the “disappeared” text today.  (more…)

 

Israel vs Turkey: Which Serves US Interests Better? Wednesday, Oct 27 2010 

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In light of Turkey’s reaction to the Israeli attack on the Gaza-bound flotilla last week, media pundits and policy wonks are already underlining the demise of the US-Turkish special relationship. The growing chorus of critics miss one vital point. Turkey was criticizing Tel Aviv’s military overkill off the Gaza coastline, not Washington’s.

So closely aligned have we become to Israel since the Reagan era, we now find ourselves reacting on behalf of the government of Israel. Instead of basing our policy determinations and official statements on the US’s national security interests, we find ourselves uniquely defending the indefensible over and over again — expending precious global political capital on Israel and attracting the whispered derision of even our allies.

In their book The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt claim that “since 1982, the US has vetoed 32 Security Council resolutions critical of Israel more than the total number of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members.”

By another count, between 1984 and 2006, the US has used its UN Security Council veto privilege 27 times on resolutions criticizing illegal Israeli actions or demanding Israel’s adherence to international law – even when the resolutions were consistent with our own official policy. In all 27 instances, we were the solitary veto in the Security Council.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but the last time a permanent member cast a lone veto was France, which refused in 1976 to recognize its former colony Mayotte as part of newly-independent Comoros.  (more…)

 

Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way Wednesday, Oct 27 2010 

Middle East and Nuclear and peace process and Turkey and US Foreign Policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 1:17 pm

The end of American influence?

It’s official. There is no longer any serious “cost” for defying the United States in the global arena. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups – and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium – Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East.

Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions, capabilities and reason.

This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. And by the double standards employed over Israel’s violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash – particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran’s nuclear program.

But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments:

1) The US’s inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, let alone push through a negotiated solution – and this after 19 years of a “US-sponsored” peace process.

2) The US’s inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran’s nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week.

In short, the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008, and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US, France, England, Germany, Russia and China could not.

We have been rendered irrelevant, despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast.  (more…)

 

US Swagger Equals Foreign Policy Disaster Monday, Jan 4 2010 

Nuclear and US Foreign Policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 7:25 pm

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki on Saturday announced Iran’s willingness to begin swapping in increments its enriched uranium for the higher-grade uranium offered by six world powers. But the concession is unlikely to be accepted by the United States, in what has become an old pattern: “Do it our way or else.”

US officials are already suggesting that Mottaki’s proposal — which would see Iran immediately part with one-third of the low-enriched uranium (LEU) requested by the five Security Council nations and Germany (P5+1) — is a deal-breaker.

As we near President Obama’s end of year deadline for Iran to accept a proposal to — get this — immediately surrender 75% of its LEU for a whole year without a reciprocal swap of higher-enriched uranium “guaranteed” by our side, one wonders why this intransigence on our part?

Surely a deal that begins an era of Iranian cooperation and concessions on the contentious nuclear issue is far more desirable than winning a staring match? And if this opportunity is lost, can we genuinely claim to know the range of consequences we may face down the line?

A small reminder of what can happen when our foreign policy officials start assuming the now familiar “American Swagger:”

The Bin Laden Deal:

A Washington Post article in 2001 revealed that in 20 meetings over three years, the US met with Taliban officials to broker a deal delivering Osama bin Laden to US courts for trial. The Taliban needed a “face-saving” way to do this deal, asking for evidence of bin Laden’s crimes and insisting he be sent to a Muslim country for trial instead.

“We never heard what they were trying to say,” said Milton Bearden, a former CIA station chief who oversaw U.S. covert operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s. “We had no common language. Ours was, ‘Give up bin Laden.’ They were saying, ‘Do something to help us give him up.’ “

Shortly after 9-11, the Taliban softened their demands significantly, dropping the requirement of evidence and agreeing to send bin Laden for trial to a third country.

But by then, President Bush’s rhetoric was unstoppable. As US bombs rained on Afghanistan, the swagger went into full swing: “You’re either with us or against us.” We’re going “to smoke them out of their caves.” Entreaties by the Taliban were “non-negotiable.” And the one that magically absolved Bush from ever publically explaining any connection between bin Laden and 9-11: “There’s no need to discuss innocence or guilt. We know he’s guilty.” The Taliban offer, it seems, was dismissed. Read full article

 

Eleventh-hour CPR On Iran Nuclear Talks Monday, Jan 4 2010 

Nuclear and US Foreign Policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 7:07 pm

Face this fact. If Iran tomorrow announced a complete halt of its uranium enrichment program and ordered an immediate dismantling of its nuclear facilities under the full supervision of an IAEA safeguards army of inspectors … we would still not cut the Islamic Republic any slack.

We would likely move to churn out IAEA General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions demanding that Iran implement the Additional Protocols of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) so that we could look inside every crevice and under every boulder in that country to assure ourselves that there wasn’t a “secret” weapons program.

And still we wouldn’t be satisfied.

Our core problem is not with Iran’s enrichment program or it’s recently revealed Fordow nuclear plant buried under a mountainside. The central issue clogging up our hotlines is that we do not trust Iran. And they do not trust us.

Some background first:

After disclosing the existence of the Fordow facility in September, Iran invited the IAEA to conduct a full inspection of the site. In advance of the highly anticipated report on its findings, IAEA Director General Muhammad ElBaradei told the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen that inspectors had found “nothing to be worried about. The idea was to use it as a bunker under the mountain to protect things,” he explained, referring to Iran’s claims that the plant would act as a back-up facility if Israel follows through with threats to attack the country’s primary enrichment site at Natanz. “It’s a hole in a mountain,” concluded ElBaradei.

Then the report came out and the mud-slinging started. The Associated Press, quoting unidentified western “diplomats,” stated in a widely-cited article that the plant “appears too small to house a civilian nuclear program, but is large enough to serve for military activities.”

The actual IAEA report released on November 16 concludes nothing of the kind. The report describes the facility blandly:

The Agency confirmed that the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Centrifuge mounting pads, header and sub-header pipes, water piping, electrical cables and cabinets had been put in place but were not yet connected.

It all matched up not only with Iran’s pre-inspection description of the Fordow site, but that of “other member states” – western countries that had been aware of the facility for years.

However, the IAEA report warns Iran that it’s delayed disclosure of Fordow “gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the Agency.”

And while Tehran has not responded publicly to this specific query, it has often raised its own questions of why – after more than two dozen IAEA reports on its nuclear program, an inspector’s visit every two weeks for six years, and by far the most exhaustive inspection regime in the Agency’s history – it is still treated with suspicion and must bear the brunt of sanctions when it has clearly adhered to the required safeguards demanded of member states. Especially since most of the allegations about its nuclear program that prompt the ongoing IAEA inspections come from unfriendly countries with hidden agendas.

The AP article just added fuel to the fire by feeding into news reports everywhere that the Fordow facility was built for nuclear weapons production. Never mind that nobody actually backed up this claim. In fact, in an article on the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, two specialists debunked that theory. While agreeing that Fordow was too small to be useful for enriching fuel for civilian nuclear reactors, the authors claim that it is even too small for military purposes.

“It would take four years to enrich enough natural uranium for just one bomb, hardly a viable breakout option.”

And not even a likely one, given that Fordow will be under IAEA safeguards and inspections the entire time.

P5+1 Talks:

On another track altogether, suspicions and mistrust continued in this vein. In October, Iran met with the five UN Security Council nations plus Germany – P5+1 – to address concerns over its nuclear intentions, among other things. In short shrift, the outlines of a deal were hammered out to alleviate western fears over the militarization of Iran’s enrichment program. The proposal was that Iran would hand over the majority of its domestically enriched uranium to Russia and France, where it would be processed further and returned to the Islamic Republic about a year later for use in a civilian capacity.

But there was no concrete agreement quite yet. The Iranian negotiating team had to head back home and get buy-in from various segments of the government. And the P5+1 started almost immediately demanding that Iran accept the proposal in full or deal with the consequences.

Back in Tehran, politics came into play. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appeared keen to push forward a deal to ensure for himself the international and domestic legitimacy he has lacked since the disputed June elections in Iran. But his opposition was just as eager to prevent him from claiming this victory. No matter the public rhetoric, rapprochement with the US is viewed as a big prize within the Islamic Republic, and the various domestic political factions are reluctant to let their opponents strike a deal easily. And so the wrangling began.

In the ensuing weeks, various reports flew out of the Iranian capital regarding the P5+1 proposal. Iran will not allow its stash of enriched uranium to leave the country. Yes, it will. Iran will not transfer its uranium to France, because France has reneged on similar agreements previously. Iran will agree to uranium storage in Turkey. Iran will only agree to the proposal if the uranium switch takes place simultaneously within its borders. And so forth.

During this time, the Obama administration has ceaselessly continued to threaten repercussions if Tehran does not agree to the P5+1 proposal by the end of the year.

ElBaradei remains firm on the issue that Iran’s current supply of enriched uranium must leave Iranian soil for this deal to work:

You need to move the material from Iran to defuse the crisis and open the space for negotiation. So, what we are asking Iran is to take a minimum risk for peace and to have an agreement not based on distrust but based on trust.

But the IAEA chief has also said: “there is total distrust on the part of Iran.” The Islamic Republic is a paranoid entity because of 30 years of western – and particularly American – attempts to isolate it. So Iran is now asking the P5+1 for “guarantees” – firm assurances that it will receive the agreed enriched uranium if it takes the risk of relinquishing its own store.

Is this guarantee request unreasonable – on any level? This is a unique opportunity to draw Iran back into the community of nations and even gain its assistance in addressing some of the US’s most pressing concerns in the Middle East – in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, all neighbors of the Islamic Republic.

There is no trust between these two nations – that much is clear. But that is also one major reason these talks are even taking place – to build trust. Yet every tiny move is so distorted by both sides – in the media, through official statements, in diplomatic backrooms – that the possibility of compromise and cooperation is undermined at every turn.

Solutions to ponder:

The question arises: is there anything that Iran can do to that would actually assuage our fears over its nuclear intentions? And is there anything the US can do that will help a fragmented Iran take a trusting step forward?

Not as things stand. Shut off the cameras. Turn off the microphones. Stop the posturing. If a deal is to be had, both sides need to plug the leaks, de-bug the rooms and conduct actual, meaningful negotiations in complete privacy. An agreement can only be reached if it does not compromise either governments’ favorability with domestic constituencies – or diminish their international and regional standing.

Remove artificial deadlines. Open up other tracks in the P5+1 discussions – these nations have many issues to discuss. Take the heat off the nuclear track and allow the Iranian factions some quiet time to reach agreement on a deal that will suit the west. Identify easily resolvable issues and engage Iran constructively on these to build trust and achieve small successes. This will build confidence and goodwill amongst all parties.

Offer Iran a free-flowing supply of enriched uranium for civilian use. Help it build nuclear reactors. Give it complete access to all resources available to nations with longstanding civilian nuclear energy programs. And watch Iran’s economic and political incentives for developing its own nuclear resources fade fast. All while the IAEA and western nations enjoy unprecedented access to every nuance of Iran’s nuclear program – inspections, oversight, inventory control – the whole nine yards.

ElBaradei leaves the scene:

On November 30, the Nobel Peace Prize winning IAEA chief leaves his post after a long and illustrious tenure. ElBaradei, who opposed the US’s invasion of Iraq on the grounds that his team had not identified any evidence that Saddam Hussein was building weapons of mass destruction, has been a careful, impartial player in the highly charged political environment surrounding Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. His departure does not bode well for the future of negotiations, and he has pressed Iran to accept a deal quickly.

In May, speaking to Newsweek magazine, ElBaradei described Iran and its negotiating team thus:

The Iranians have always been extremely well briefed on the details. They know what they want. They are excellent on the strategic goals, excellent on waiting for the right price. I don’t want to make them sound like superhumans; you do see a lot of infighting among them. And part of it is about who is going to get credit for finally breaking out of this 30 years of fighting and confrontation with the United States. Everybody is positioning himself to be the national hero who would finally put Iran back onto the world map as part of the mainstream. They are not like the stereotyped fanatics bent on destroying everybody around them. They are not.

The Iranians will have to reign in their factionalism for any deal to work, but the P5+1 need to give them time and incentives to do so.

First published: November 27, 2009, Huffington Post

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Interview: Hezbollah And Hamas on Obama, Netanyahu, Terrorism … And Oprah Monday, Jan 4 2010 

Hamas and Hezbollah and Israel , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 5:39 pm

In early August and late October, I met with Hamas’ Usama Hamdan and Hezbollah’s Ammar Mousawi, chiefs of their respective organizations’ foreign relations portfolios. The two groups are vastly different in structure, level of development and historical experiences, but share much in common too. Each can credit its origin to Israeli occupation. Hamas was born on the eve of the first Palestinian Intifada, from a single incident when an Israeli truck mowed — some claim deliberately — into a carload of Palestinian workers in the Gaza strip. Officially formed in 1985, Hezbollah, in turn, was jumpstarted by Israel’s 1982 invasion and occupation of Southern Lebanon. Although Hamas is a Sunni organization and Hezbollah a Shiite one, both groups embrace Islamic values as their core ideology and driving principle, though their political actions appear to be driven more by realpolitik than Quranic mandate. And the two groups form part of an increasingly powerful Mideast bloc that unapologetically refuses to accept any regional status quo that features an occupying and militarily adventurous Israel.

Hamas and Hezbollah are both seasoned denizens of the US State Department’s List of Terrorist Organizations, a designation that seems odd when one considers that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese would fall through the cracks without the vital social services — healthcare, education, employment, infrastructure development — these two groups provide their indigenous populations. Ask a secular Palestinian or Lebanese civilian which of their political parties they trust most, and even the most begrudging among them may name Hamas or Hezbollah as the “cleanest” of their politicians.

And this influence continues regionally. Polls throughout the Middle East consistently point to Hezbollah’s secretary general Hassan Nasrallah as the most popular leader in the Arab world. Hamas’ Khaled Meshaal is never far behind — a far cry from his main political opponent, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, whose US-supported Fatah party is viewed as corrupt and incompetent, sometimes even by its own supporters. Despite US and Israeli efforts to isolate these groups by swathing them in the dreaded “terrorist” label and all that implies post 9-11, even pro-US Arab leaders are careful not to malign these groups. Popularity rubs off, so to speak.

But this isolation from mostly Western nations has taken its toll. Officials of both groups recognize that any resolution of conflict in the Middle East will likely necessitate US and European involvement. Concurrently, it appears that the West has copped on to a similar notion – that any resolution of regional conflicts will in turn necessitate the involvement of both Hamas and Hezbollah.

As a result, former US officials and current European officials have been making quiet pilgrimages to Beirut and Damascus for some years now – with occasional reciprocal visits – to try to build relationships and influence these groups. Tellingly, Hezbollah’s Mousawi was meeting with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner just hours after our final interview. The going has been hard, but he points to the European Union’s non-interference policy during the June Lebanese elections as a dividend of improved communications.

So where do things stand on rapprochement? What do they think of Obama? Do they have “hope” that US policy will “change?” What do they think of the peace process? Extremist groups in the Mideast – who are the worst offenders? Do they find inspiration in Americans and who might these figures be? Hamdan and Mousawi had plenty to say.

On Obama…

Ammar Mousawi, Hezbollah Foreign Relations Chief

Ammar Mousawi: There is no doubt that we find certain traits that are distinguished in the character of Obama — that he is no repetition of former US presidents. When we listen to his speeches, we certainly note something new. However, the political forces that make policy in the US allow any exceptional steps to be only limited. There is no doubt that there is a change in tone, but it is doubtful that there will be a change in policy. If change were to take place, it would not be in Cairo University — it would have to be in the US Congress.

We know that Obama is experiencing political difficulties from his opponents. He is being besieged in domestic policy challenges and internal issues – healthcare reform, issues of his roots. So when he declared his ambitious approach for his solutions for the Mideast, they sent him the Israel lobby to put him in a corner.

Usama Hamdan: I think there has been no change since Obama became president. In fact, I believe we faced a great failure last month (when the US administration caved on the issue of an Israeli settlement freeze in the West Bank). It was a minor failure, but a failure nonetheless. Brings me as a Palestinian to ask why Palestinians should accept any conditions when Israel doesn’t. I liked Obama’s Cairo speech, but we have to see what happens on the ground.

The US is putting itself in a corner by thinking it is their responsibility to protect Israel in the region when Israel is doing the attacking. Someone has to be courageous enough – there must be conditions for Israel. If you have a child that doesn’t have to follow rules, he will be spoilt. Israel is the US’s spoilt child.

The US has to say to the Israeli government “That’s it.” They can do that. It is not so simple, but it is not too difficult either. Who in the world will support Israel against the US? Fifty percent of Europeans identified Israel as the biggest threat to peace and stability in the world — not in the Middle East — but in the world.

I understand that Obama is facing internal and external problems and pressures. But his priorities are not clear to us — he seems confused. Palestinians will not wait forever.

On Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:

Hamas Foreign Policy Chief Usama Hamdan

Usama Hamdan: Netanyahu has always been against a genuine peace process. We had experience with him when he was prime minister from 1996-98 — he undermined the Oslo Agreements, he divided the issues – there is a very bad experience with him. Adding to this is his foreign minister is Avigdor Lieberman — the worst political figure in all the world. Add to that Ehud Barak. We are facing a government formed of extremists. Netanyahu, Lieberman and Barak? The worst combination in Israeli history.

Ammar Mousawi: One of the unfortunate aspects of Obama’s term as president is that it is coupled with Netanyahu’s. Netanyahu is not ready to even have an “apparent” flexibility toward peace.

On being called “terrorists:”

Ammar Mousawi: The War on Terror’s objective was to corner legitimate resistance and prevent it from achieving its mission. The West still resists differentiating between resistance and terrorism — and that is done on purpose. Resistance is defined as a legal fight against occupation as opposed to terrorism, which is defined as systematically killing innocent people. We are interested in having a dialog with the West because we would like to make them aware of our point of view. Resistance is part of world history — it is not an uncommon thing. All these negative positions taken by the West are because of their support for Israel and unwillingness to see that the people of this region have the right to exist in peace. After the failure of all their attempts to destroy these resistance groups through military and political means, they concluded that they must now know more about us, how we operate. And so the dialogue begins.

(Hezbollah has been on the US terrorism list since 1999. Only the US, Israel and Canada recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.)

Usama Hamdan: We were listed on the US terrorism list in 1993 just because Israel asked for it — before that we had direct contacts with the Americans. We even sent a letter to then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asking why. They know that they are wrong in this. They know that anyone who supports rights and justice supports the Palestinians. We want them to accept Hamas as the choice of the Palestinian people – they must respect the fact that Palestinians are committed to their rights. They will talk with us eventually. We are not in a hurry for that.

In the West, they try to shape you before dealing with you. This is the Palestinian experience. They’ve done this with Fatah. Hamas’ position is to say what we are, what we stand for – clearly – and we can defend our rights best that way.

On Extremist Islamic Groups:

Usama Hamdan: All Islamists should want the good of their people. The most important point is how they deal with their own communities. In my belief, you have to be a good man to your own people – not push them hard or kill them if they don’t accept your point of view. In Rafah, Gaza this August, we had clashes with a minority group which started killing Palestinians just because they had different ideas, by putting bombs in internet cafes, beauty salons and wedding parties.

We are against groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban for this reason. We condemned the attacks of 9-11, the explosions in London, the Madrid bombing when it was clear to us that these were not accidents.

Ammar Mousawi: We try to promote a positive image of Islam that is open to dialogue between people and cultures. We are not responsible for the actions of groups that present a different picture of Islam. We do not agree with the behavior of these groups — they give a negative view of Islam. But the question is who created and supported these extremists?

What gives life to these entities is the policies of the West: unlimited support for Israel will cause this extremism. All the wars in Afghanistan will feed this extremism. We are in a situation where we will have wars with no end. Sovereignty, development, mutual respect, the right to determine your own destiny — these issues need dialog, not wars.

Hezbollah condemns the deliberate killing of innocent people — it promotes in us a sense of sadness as happened with 9-11, London, Madrid. And if there are some differences between us and the US, this is not the way to sort out our problems — these acts are not excusable.

Mr. Mousawi, what is the status of efforts to form a Lebanese unity government — and what are the chances of such a government being successful in overcoming the deadlocks and disagreements of the past?

We believe there are currently good chances for the formation of a national unity government, having overcome the most serious obstacles. We have finally reached agreement on the inclusion of Jubran Basil as a member of the cabinet, and General Michel Aoun has been granted the Telecommunications Ministry, both issues having been points of contention for the opposition.
As for the issue over various ministries, we are still deliberating the cabinet posts that will go to the opposition, but we are hopeful that things will go smoothly.

Mr. Hamdan, what is the status of efforts to form a Palestinian Unity agreement between Hamas and Fatah? How will this impact the holding of elections in 2010?

I have to say that we are still committed to the Palestinian reconciliation and we are willing to have this reconciliation for the benefit of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian cause. I believe that Mahmoud Abbas’ move to hold elections on January 24, 2010 has undermined these efforts, but we are still working with the Egyptians to overcome this problem. However, I believe that no elections will take place without reconciliation between the two parties. On this same issue, a few days ago, Abu Mazen declared a clear failure in the peace process, saying that he will not be a candidate in the upcoming election. I think that was supposed to be a helpful step to go back to the Palestinian dialogue, because when you feel there is a failure in the process, you have to go back to the people. I think Abu Mazen was saying there is a failure in the political track, and he invited all the people to support national unity, to face the Israeli threat. This may help Palestinian unity.

No one can trust that there will be real elections without Palestinian unity and so it will be a waste of time and a new complication in the Palestinian cause if there is an election without this unity.

There must be a change in the Israeli mentality because they must understand that without ending the occupation, there will be no peace.

Outside of your own bloc, name a Middle Eastern leader you admire and tell us why:

Ammar Mousawi: I admire the Emir of Qatar who made something of his country — it is small, but he has made it into a country of influence. They’ve helped us in rebuilding what Israel destroyed in its 2006 attack on Lebanon. The Emir was the first and only Arab head of state to come to the suburbs of Beirut to witness the horrifying destruction of the Israeli aggression. And we thank him for this because it motivated our own Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to come himself. Imagine the prime minister of all Lebanon didn’t see the urgency to visit this area that had taken heavy bombardment and destruction? We are embarrassed in one sense, and angry on the other hand.

Your thoughts on US Middle East policy?

Ammar Mousawi: America is a great nation — to get to this place has taken some great people, and a certain individuality that is renowned through history. We have no issues with the American people, we share many concerns with them on their government’s policies. We have in the Middle East paid a heavy price for US policy. There are many Americans paying for these failed policies of previous administrations. Bush’s ratings in the US dropped into the 20s. Therefore, can anybody be surprised if we say we object to aspects of US foreign policy?

We would like to say to Americans that they are subjecting themselves to a double standard – on one hand talking about values and on the other hand resisting and undermining these very values through their unconditional support of Israel’s actions. The way they have received and treated the Goldstone Report has caused an uproar here.

I tell you this – America will not find anyone to assist it to come out of its Mideast crisis other than this bloc of nations that Hezbollah belongs to. If we count today the total US crises – in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, even Pakistan, what does the supposed Arab “moderate” bloc have and what does our group have in terms of cards to help the US. The strength is in the hands of our resistance bloc.

Usama Hamdan: The US administration has to realize that Israel is occupying Palestinian lands, not the other way around. But they are sending weapons to be used against Palestinians every day — at least $2 billion worth is sent to Israel annually. They have to put these basic facts on the table before pointing a finger at Hamas’ rockets. We have said before we are ready to engage in a prolonged ceasefire if there is a complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian lands — they did not even try to respond to this offer.

There is a peace process. Hamas opposes that peace process, not because we like to be against it, but because we believe there is no real peace. The Israelis and the sponsors of the process, mainly the US administration, were not creating peace through negotiations, they were dismantling the Palestinian cause. If you go through the Oslo Agreement, you discover that this agreement pushed aside the main issues that created the conflict -the status of Jerusalem, the land, sovereignty of a future Palestinian state, the right of return for refugees, and our natural resources. They said all of these have to be negotiated afterward!

We have an Arab saying that goes: the one who is safe from punishment will act badly. Israel feels it is totally protected, that it can do anything — it feels it is a country above the law when the US uses its veto to protect Israel at every turn. If the Arabs work to protect their own interests, talk to the Americans about their mutual interests, I think the Americans will see the value of re-balancing their strategic interests in the region.

At the moment, nobody in the region can view the US as an honest broker of peace. That is because of the history of American foreign policy. The US has to make a major change – they have to show that they are balanced on the Palestinian issue and not just following the line of the Israeli lobby in the US.

Mr. Hamdan, are there any US presidents you admire, and why?

George Washington, because he led his people to independence. And John F. Kennedy, because he tried to make a change for the better.

Mr. Mousawi, do you watch any American television shows? Any particular programs you admire?

My wife likes the Oprah show, and I watch it with her sometimes — Oprah seems to cover some interesting topics of social value.

First published: November 9, 2009

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