Assad’s Removal is Not on Moscow’s Mind Today Monday, Jun 25 2012 

By Sharmine Narwani – The New York Times, June 25, 2012 (Unedited version)

When we look back at Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya this past year, we have to ask whether the premise of “dictator leaves, problem solved” is remotely valid.

It is a key reason why Russia has little incentive to relinquish support of its longtime ally Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Russian position was entirely evident during the recent Putin-Obama meeting when the question of Assad’s removal came up.

“Then what?” Putin is said to have responded.

Aside from Russia’s own strategic alliance with Syria, they have several urgent concerns. Firstly, the Russian position is firmly tied to that of the BRICs today. These four disparate economic-political powerhouses have resolved to redress a global imbalance of power and Syria has become a frontline state in this effort. The BRICs insist that Syrians should resolve their crisis with minimal intervention, which precludes forcing regime change from the outside.

Secondly, the external parties that are demanding Assad’s ouster are the same handful of NATO-GCC interventionists that brought us the Libyan catastrophe under the cloak of Responsibility To Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Intervention narratives. The Russians deeply regret having signing on to the Security Council resolution that enabled the unraveling of Libya, and will go to great lengths to prevent the same scenario in Syria. (more…)

Three Mideast Stink Bombs Friday, Apr 8 2011 

By Sharmine Narwani

Popular revolts may be spinning through the Arab world with a fervor and determination not seen in decades, but efforts to sidetrack the reform momentum are also gaining strength.

Three issues have plagued the region for decades and threaten to derail progress at every turn. I call them the Mideast’s “Stink Bombs” – hyper-divisive issues that inflame passions and serve a politicized minority only: 1) Religious vs. Secular; 2) Sunni vs. Shia; 3) Arabs vs. Iranians.

While protestors have been cautious in avoiding confrontations on these issues (who said the Arab Street is not smart?), political figures inside and outside the Mideast, and extremists on all sides, have sought at regular intervals to undermine national and regional unity with these polarizing issues.

The Stink Bombs have subverted the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, al Nahda in Tunisia, the Ikhwan in Jordan, and stirred sectarian strife between Shia and Sunni in Bahrain and Yemen – two countries that also depend on the Iran card to justify all their unlawful actions against civilians. The Stink Bombs have worked to prevent common cause on the Palestinian issue, and to undermine regional resistance to US, Israeli and western hegemonic designs, by keeping populations divided and in conflict.

Confidence in government authorities is at such a low ebb among Arab populations, that in some cases, these threats are being ignored or challenged head on. But that will not always be the case, and protestors and reformists alike will need to be vigilant in guarding against attempts to hijack progress with these long-held dogmas.

Let’s look at the Stink Bombs in more detail:

Stink Bomb #1: Religious versus Secular
This one has been played out skillfully through narratives that have long sought to associate Islam with extremism and terrorism. Washington’s close friends in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco, Algeria and other places have exploited the “Islamist” narrative to put a lid on moderate Muslim groups within their countries and gain unfettered US political and financial support for their elite.

For decades, grassroots Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood have been either banned outright or subjected to intimidation, detentions and political machinations that have deprived them of fair participation in governing bodies. After September 11, Washington’s narratives on Islamists held them all to be one and the same – on virtual par with America’s greatest enemy, Al Qaeda – and any effort to differentiate between groups was largely ignored in the political mainstream.

Any non-ideological US area specialist could have pointed to half a dozen groups on the US list of terrorist organizations that should not have been featured in that unfortunate blacklist, but they would have been fighting a tidal wave during the height of the Afghanistan and Iraq occupations, the 2006 Lebanon war, and the orchestrated removal of Hamas after its election victory.

When the Bush administration failed to achieve even its most elementary war goals, then UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband took a half-hearted shot at pointing out the obvious:

Miliband wrote in the Guardian in January 2010 that efforts to “lump” extremists together had been counterproductive, playing “into the hands of those seeking to unify groups with little in common.”

But instead, the West stood aside during recent elections in Egypt and Jordan when the ruling secular establishments absolutely undermined the participation of their respective Islamist political candidates and parties.

Copts forming protective circle around praying Muslims

During the wave of protests in Tahrir Square in January and February, the world witnessed the schism between populations and their rulers on this hot-button issue. After attacks on politically-secular Coptic Christians who make up ten percent of the nation’s populace, Egyptians demonstrated their skepticism about the source of this sectarian strife in a startling display of unity. That Friday, Copts linked arms to form a protective circle around praying Muslims. On Sunday, Muslims returned the favor for Christians.

To be sure, secularists and religious minorities don’t face an easy time in the Middle East, particularly with the boom in Salafist extremism and growing conservatism experienced, in particular, after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Of the three Stink Bombs, this is the one that has some legs in a troubled Middle East where foreign intervention and autocratic rule has ensured stagnation on the political and social fronts. But this does not negate the very real threat that religious and secular groups – both ideologues in their own way – can be exploited to divide and manage populations.

Stink Bomb #2: Sunni versus Shia
With roots in an age-old rivalry between those who believed the Prophet Muhammad’s successors should be selected from among his faithful companions (Sunni) and those who believed that Muslims should be led by members of the Prophet’s family (Shia), this issue is essentially a political one – the Sunni and Shia share the most fundamental Islamic beliefs and articles of faith, after all. (more…)

WikiLeaks Iran Cables — New York Times in Full-Spin Mode Thursday, Dec 2 2010 

By Sharmine Narwani

The Iran Cables

The New York Times‘ lengthy explanation of why it decided to publish the WikiLeaks Cables leaves out one important consideration. What on earth would the State Department have done if a major US paper had not “interpreted” the information dump for the American masses?

Someone had to take on the “national responsibility” of “crafting” the leaks into supporting US policy initiatives, after all.

In the first few days after the WikiLeaks Cables release, there was notably disproportionate focus on what amounts to nothing more than political gossip — the tired old refrain of Arab leaders warmongering against Iran, Turkish PM Erdogan’s “hatred” for Israel — over the critical examination of actual behind-the-scenes policy deliberations that contradict our public stances: regime change discussions on Iran, US-Israeli collusion on almost all things Mideast, and the startling revelations that deal-brokering in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and over Iran’s nuclear program is a mere facade?

The Wikileaks Cables are plump with evidence of US doublespeak, proof that “conspiracy-minded” Middle Easterners are, well, correct on most counts.

Iran Was Right

Here is a startling September 2009 Cable from the US Embassy in London summarizing a high level US-UK meeting that included British Foreign Secretary David Miliband and US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher. Discussing the upcoming P5+1 talks on Iran’s nuclear program, the principals agree to push through an unrealistically short time frame for negotiations, and initiate plans for sanctions almost immediately. The recommendation that western nations tie together Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs is as politically cynical as things come:

FS Milband opined that U.S. Administration is “rightly trying to overcome a deficit of prejudice and mistrust in a relatively short time” by diplomatic outreach to Iran. He continued that the Iranian elections were a “bad outcome” — an outcome that had given extremists the upper hand and resulted in a “culling of reformists.” Miliband said that, in his opinion, Iran’s extremist government would not make concessions in a short time. Nonetheless, the U.S. “Administration’s support for a diplomatic solution is very wise.” He praised the impact of financial sanctions spearheaded by Treasury U/S Levey. Leslie asserted that the Iranian administration is “in a state of flux” and “not focused,” so probably unable to respond to overtures.

McDonald stressed that the PM supports the President’s outreach efforts to Iran, but this outreach should not be “open ended.” The UK view is that “if Iran is not responsive, we have to get serious.” UK experts have concluded that stronger sanctions should be in place by the end of the year if Iran is not significantly responsive by the end of September. McDonald observed that it would take some time to negotiate a UNSCR; in the meantime, the UK is considering national steps it could take as well as possible steps the EU could take. HMG shares NSA Jones’ view that proliferation problems posed by Iran and North Korea should be addressed together, not as separate, unrelated issues, McDonald said.

One can hardly fault the Iranians for believing that the US was never serious about negotiations, and the Cable is a reminder of the days before our invasion of Iraq, when Baghdad complained that every time they tried to make concessions on IAEA inspections, “the goalposts were moved.”

After the June 2009 Iranian elections, the regime often complained publicly about US/Israeli/British interference in domestic affairs, and warned that “external” players were undertaking a “regime change” agenda. These comments were generally dismissed by US and Israeli officials and by our media. But a 2007 Wikileaks Cable from the US Embassy in Tel Aviv lends credibility to Iran’s warnings. Israel’s Mossad Chief Meir Dagan discusses a “Five Pillar” Iran strategy with Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Burns – who also leads the US delegation at nuclear talks with Iran.  Besides advocating covert activity, further sanctions, political and counter proliferation efforts, the Cable discloses Israel’s fifth “pillar” in its Iran agenda:

“Force Regime Change: Dagan said that more should be done to foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support of student democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris, Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.”

Iran’s suspicions don’t seem quite so implausible any longer.

Arabs Vs Iran — The New York Times Refrain

Instead of honing in on significant disclosures that shed some light on the many Middle East policy failures that have marked US decision making in the region for decades, the US press went with “silly” and “sully.” Those much-touted Cables reporting the acidic — and not very diplomatic — barbs of Arab leaders against Iran do not represent any “new” thinking, and need instead to be examined in context:

Firstly, these rulers have never recovered from their 1979 “bogeyman” fear of a Shia-majority, non-Arab, Islamist regional hegemon on their doorstep — one that continued to thrive even after the predominantly Sunni, Arab Persian-Gulf nations, Egypt, Jordan and others misguidedly backed Saddam Hussein’s hostile 1980 invasion of Iranian territory.

Secondly, many of these rulers are viewed – internally and throughout the Arab world — as corrupt, often illegitimate and beholden to foreign interests. These heads of state are bitterly resentful that, by comparison, leaders like Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syria’s Bashar al Assad are viewed vastly more favorably by populations throughout the Mideast and Muslim world.

In fact, when asked in a July 2010 Brookings poll about the prospects of a “nuclear” Iran, 57% of the populations of the same Arab nations whose leaders were caught in this Wikileaks pants-down-moment supported a nuclearized Iran. Why? Because only 10% of the Arab public view Iran as a threat, as opposed to their leaders. Instead, 88% of Arabs views Israel as their main threat, followed closely by 77% who worry about the United States.

To be honest, the “real” story is that this many Arab nations had secret dealings with Israel, which they bash very publicly for domestic and regional consumption. I suppose the theme here is Iran-in-secret, Israel-in-public. (more…)

Thomas Friedman and His Mideast Blindspots Wednesday, Oct 27 2010 

Friedman concocting his version of the world

Nothing annoys me more about New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman than his tendency to scuttle his occasionally insightful commentary with fabricated assumptions to fit his narrative.

You know that irritation that grows under your skin when somebody is making a lot of sense and then suddenly — wham — they hit you with a doozy so ridiculous you feel disproportionately deflated?

Well, that is my Friedman experience time and time again. Not always though — sometimes I am irritated from the get-go.

In his latest column on Tuesday, Friedman shines a light on a very true Middle East reality — one that quite deliberately gets downplayed in Washington’s power centers: The Mideast is now, for the first time since the Cold War ended, largely defined by two blocs of influence and their respective worldviews.

The first, is the US-led bloc consisting of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan — the latter three often ignominiously referred to as the “moderate” Arab states. The second, is the grouping sometimes referred to as the “resistance” bloc that consists of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas.

Friedman’s column posits that there are five key actors in the Israeli-Palestinian equation today: Israel, America, the “moderate” Arabs, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and the resistance bloc.

Look, I can give him that — I don’t have a fundamental problem with the fact that he only includes one key individual from the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority to represent the entire Palestinian side. Fatah, on its own, is rather irrelevant these days, except in the minds of the US bloc. And kudos to Tom for recognizing this nuance.

Friedman then makes his main thrust, which is that only two of these actors actually have clear strategies for a Palestinian-Israeli solution: Fayyad, the former World Bank economist who, peace or no peace, wants to create a de facto Palestinian state on the ground within two years — and the resistance bloc. That’s true enough. Friedman goes on to press the other three players to forge a clear, unified strategy — preferably backing Fayyad’s plan — which can foil the agenda of the resistance bloc.

And then I did my double take. Iran… Hezbollah… Hamas… Where was Syria?

Ah, Thomas. You did that doozy-thing.  (more…)

Thomas Friedman — Hasbara GrandMaster Or Elitist Dupe? Monday, Jan 4 2010 

Hard as I try, my mouth is fixed in an unattractive gape — unable, it seems, to correct itself. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, in his usual clumsy attempts to suggest liberal sympathy while in fact propagating many, many Mideast myths, has caused this unfortunate disfigurement.

In his most recent column on Saturday, Friedman decided to help us understand a phenomenon sweeping the Arab and Muslim worlds, and was generous enough to coin an actual phrase to simplify this concept for the benefit of all Western civilization — he calls it “The Narrative.”

According to the New York Times columnist, “The Narrative is the cocktail of half-truths, propaganda and outright lies about America that have taken hold in the Arab-Muslim world since 9/11.” Yes, he capitalizes it. Like “The Donald.” Or “The Treaty of Versailles.”

Kind of him to generalize this way. It would have been far more difficult for me if I actually had to think about the Arab-Muslim world as a diverse grouping representing real-life individuals from varying cultures, histories, religions, political persuasions and stages of social, political and economic development.

In his column, Friedman expands on his “The Narrative,” saying these Arab-Muslims feel that “America has declared war on Islam, as part of a grand “American-Crusader-Zionist conspiracy” to keep Muslims down.”

I don’t suppose that our declaration of a grandiose “War on Terror” which refused to distinguish between extremist Salafi militants and legitimate resistance movements — dubbed a “mistake” by no less a figure than British Foreign Secretary David Miliband earlier this year — had anything to do with that perception?

Miliband wrote in the Guardian in January that the term “War on Terror” is “misleading and mistaken,” and that efforts to “lump” extremists together had been counterproductive, playing “into the hands of those seeking to unify groups with little in common.”

How positively Friedman-esque. Read full article

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