Surprise Video Changes Syria “Timeline” Wednesday, Apr 4 2012 

Arab Awakening and Foreign Affairs and Human Rights and Media and Syria , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 5:43 pm

By Sharmine Narwani

Of all the myths obstructing the honest portrayal of events in Syria this past year, none has been more fiercely guarded by regime-change advocates than this one stark falsehood:

Myth – the Syrian regime has been shooting only unarmed, peaceful protestors until very recently when opposition groups finally decided to arm themselves in self-defense.

On the contrary, there is clear evidence that armed groups have targeted and killed security forces and civilians from within weeks of the first small protests in March 2011. An earlier investigative piece I wrote on the Syrian casualty lists identifies the shooting deaths of nine Syrian soldiers in Banyas on April 10, 2011 as one important timeline marker for premeditated opposition violence.

Ignoring this vital piece of information about the security landscape has helped shape a fundamentally flawed narrative of events in Syria. Furthermore, this false storyline has directly contributed to the escalation of the crisis by inciting rage against the “one-sided” violence of the regime, and emboldening opponents with a misplaced “righteousness” that kills legitimate debate on Syria.

But this narrative has been unraveling in the past few months. Photos and video footage of armed men with heavy weapons proudly declaring their stripes – some of them religious extremists advocating the killing of civilians based on sectarian differences – have been recently making the rounds.

Jihadist web chatter about armed groups in Syria, suicide bombings in Damascus and Aleppo, and now Al Qaeda’s “call to battle” have forced western pundits – who know a red line when they see one – to grudgingly acknowledge there are two sides in Syria’s violent tug of war.

Quite suddenly, this has forced a shift in the discourse on Syria. Regime opponents have taken care, however, to ensure that the new narrative incorporates the existence of armed groups without challenging the core premise that “the regime massacres peaceful protestors.”

This effectively means that armed opposition can only be introduced into the Syrian crisis “timeline” at a date long after the outbreak of protests. (more…)

 

New Phase in Syria Crisis: Dealmaking Toward An Exit Wednesday, Mar 21 2012 

Arab Awakening and Foreign Affairs and Middle East and Syria and United Nations and US Foreign Policy , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 9:01 pm

By Sharmine Narwani

In recent weeks, there has been a notable shuffle in the positions of key external players in the Syrian crisis. Momentum has quite suddenly shifted from an all-out onslaught against the Assad government to a quiet investigation of exit strategies.

The clashes between government forces and opposition militias in Baba Amr were a clear tipping point for these players – much hinged on the outcome of that battle. Today, the retreat of armed groups from the Homs neighborhood means one thing: the strategy of militarizing the conflict from within is no longer a plausible option on which to hang this geopolitical battle. Especially not in an American or French election year, when anything less than regime change in Syria will look like abject failure.

And so the external players are shifting gears – the more outspoken ones, quietly seeking alternative options. There are two de facto groups that have formed. Group A is looking for a face-saving exit from the promised escalation in Syria. It consists of the United States, European Union and Turkey. Group B, on the other hand, is heavily invested in regime-change at any cost, and includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar and some elements of the French, US, British and Libyan establishments.

Before Baba Amr, these two groups were unified in maximizing their every resource to force regime change in Syria. When the UN Security Council option was blocked by Russia and China, they coalesced around the General Assembly and ad-hoc “Friends of Syria” to build coalitions, tried unsuccessfully to bring a disparate opposition fighting force (Free Syrian Army) under central leadership, pushed to recognize the disunited Syrian National Council (SNC), and eked out weekly “events” like embassy closures and political condemnations to maintain a “perception momentum.”

But those efforts have largely come to a standstill after Baba Amr. A reliable source close to the Syrian regime said to me recently: “The regime eliminated the biggest and most difficult obstacle – Baba Amr. Elsewhere, it (eliminating armed militias) is easier and less costly at all levels. Now both political and military steps can continue.” (more…)

 

Syrian Snaphot: A View From The Capital Wednesday, Jan 25 2012 

Arab Awakening and Foreign Affairs and Middle East and Syria , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 11:07 am

By Sharmine Narwani

Aftermath of the Midan bombing that left 26 dead and dozens more wounded

January 2012:

Crossing over the Lebanese border into Syria was anticlimactic. The lines of people waiting to have their papers checked did not look markedly shorter than during my two previous visits, both having taken place well before popular Arab revolts broke out across the Middle East.

Even security checks — looking into the trunk of our car and the kinds of questions asked by immigration personnel — appeared, if anything, less probing than my earlier experiences.

But two things caught my notice. Posters vilifying certain media networks — Al Jazeera, Saudi-owned Al Arabiya, and the BBC — dotted the walls of the border crossing. One to the right of the counter for “foreigners” hovered over the head of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) crew in line in front of me. Ah, I thought — the rumors that foreign journalists are now trickling into Syria may be accurate.

The second noteworthy detail was the whispers among border personnel that a busload of Syrian soldiers being transported from their barracks had been bombed by a roadside IED — near Zabadani, a town now claimed by the armed opposition. I have no confirmation of this.

I was worried about my stay in Damascus in the Christian quarter of the Old City. Just four days earlier, on a Friday, a suicide bomber had detonated explosives in a crowded area in Midan — inside the capital — apparently targeting a bus of policemen, although the casualties were mostly civilians.

I was keen to see if there were tangible ramifications of this act of terror in the heart of Damascus — 10 months into the protests, the city is still largely viewed as being supportive of the government. Damascus counts. No uprising will be complete unless this city of 2.6 million shifts that balance. The capitol will eventually have to be a battlefield for any revolt to succeed, even if only a political one.

Syria is icy cold this time of year, which may account for some of the empty streets that are normally bustling with humanity. But the Friday after the suicide bombing, the streets were noticeably devoid of people, cars were minimal — the city, quiet. Friday, the Muslim day of prayer, is usually spent with family, so it wasn’t altogether clear if the stillness was due to the previous week’s violence.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s voice greeted us on the radio as my friend and I drove into the country a few days earlier. He was delivering his fifth speech since protests broke out in March last year. It was long-winded and my companion translated every so often. I waited impatiently for these tidbits which lasted well after we were sipping tea in a Damascus hotel lobby — guests and conference attendees crowding around the TV screens to pass their judgments.

Later that day I met with the first on my list of regime opponents, most of whom had served prison terms at some point in their lives. I will write in more detail about these men and women later, but they varied from those who desired an overhaul of the regime while keeping Assad’s presidency intact, to those who would not consider dialogue with any part of the existing government. There were some commonalities. All rejected any foreign military intervention and the militarization of the protests. The majority were scathing about the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and external opposition groups like the Syrian National Council (SNC), so liberally quoted by the Western media as the definitive voice of the Syrian “opposition.”

“Their decisions are made in America and Turkey,” said one regime critic about the foreign-based Syrian opposition. “I want decisions made in Syria.” (more…)

 

Stratfor Challenges Narratives on Syria Tuesday, Dec 20 2011 

Arab Awakening and Foreign Affairs and Media and Middle East and Syria , , , , , , , , , Sandboxer 7:10 am

By Sharmine Narwani


Since the first public protests broke out in Syria last March, the narratives about the Syrian crisis have stayed fairly true to the theme of all the Arab Revolts. An authoritarian ruler out to crush peaceful opposition to his regime opens fire on civilians and the number of protestors skyrockets as the body count mounts…

But we are now entering the tenth month of this particular violent revolt – even Libya with its full-fledged civil war didn’t take so long. So what gives?

According to the Texas-based geopolitical risk analysis group Stratfor which released an eyebrow-raising piece on Syrian opposition propaganda efforts last week, “most of the opposition’s more serious claims have turned out to be grossly exaggerated or simply untrue, thereby revealing more about the opposition’s weaknesses than the level of instability inside the Syrian regime.”

This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it may be the first time a mainstream US-based intelligence-gathering firm openly questions the existing narrative on Syria. Secondly, Stratfor’s findings begs the question: what are we basing our policy initiatives on if our underlying assumptions are inaccurate?

How unstable is Syria, really? How widespread is opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad? The death-toll that has us riveted with disgust – today, the highest daily death rate yet – how accurate are those numbers? Who do they include and are they verifiable? Are local activists even capable of distinguishing between a dead pro-regime civilian and a dead anti-regime civilian – especially now that both sides are armed and firing?

I cannot begin to dispute those numbers and details, so I will not try. But I will ask the question: where are all the “facts” coming from? (more…)

 

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