The problem with US policy in the Middle East is that it now operates almost entirely at the political level: gone are the days when area experts were the heavyweights in the command center, weaving historical context, relationships and nuance into vital policy decisions.

Today you are more likely to have single-issue interest groups, commercial projects and election cycles impact key deliberations. It’s a short-term view: tactical more than strategic and black and white in its approach. Like a high-octane marketing campaign, it is heavily focused on key phrases, scene-setting, and narrative building.

The spotlight on Syria in recent weeks has been intense and the propaganda has been incessant: Regime massacres in Homs, evil Russia and China, a benevolent UN Security Council trying to save Syria, 1982′s Hama slaughter resuscitated, and an American ambassador left “disgusted” at the gall of others using veto power.

But take the hysteria down a notch or two, bring the debate back into the hands of measured, experienced observers, and the storyline may be tangibly different. Over the weekend, I had the privilege of receiving an email that reminded me of a time when area experts at the US State Department delivered honest assessments of events so that wiser decisions could be taken.

The missive was from a former US diplomat with service experience in Syria who has asked to remain unnamed. I am publishing the email below in its entirety for the benefit of readers:

“I have serious problems with all the talk about military intervention in Syria. Everyone, especially the media, seems to be relying solely on anti-regime activists for their information. How do we know 260 people were killed by the regime in Homs yesterday? That number seems based solely on claims by anti-regime figures and I seriously doubt its accuracy.

I served over three years in Damascus at the US Embassy and I know how difficult it is to sort fact from rumor in that closed political society. We were constantly trying to verify rumors that we had heard about assassinations, regime arrests, etc., and that included the Agency, which was just as much in the dark as everyone else. Today, we have a skeleton embassy which I am sure is under constant surveillance and with very few personnel to go out and report on what is happening. When I was in Damascus over two years ago, I was less than impressed with the Embassy’s sources and with its understanding of the dynamics of what was going on Syria. And the same is true when I talk to officials at the State Department.

The media, and to an extent the Administration, have personalized the conflict in Syria as being about Bashar Assad and his family. They have consistently underestimated the sectarian nature of the conflict there. It is not just Bashar Assad and his family that are hanging onto power at all costs, it is the entire Alawi system of control of the country, including the military, the security services and the Baath Party. I believe that Alawites firmly think that if they lose power, the Sunnis will slaughter them, That was one reason Hafez and his brother Rifaat were so ruthless in Hama thirty years ago. And everyone in the West conveniently forgets the campaign of assassinations and suicide bombings carried out in the three or four years before Hama by the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the country. I personally witnessed the aftermath of such bombings in which several hundred people were killed. While the State Department, the CIA and other organs of government may have short historical memories, the people in Syria do not.

There have been few good analyses of the conflict in Syria. With the exception of the journalist Nir Rosen and the International Crisis Group, most reporting has been superficial and biased in favor of opponents of the regime. This is no basis on which to base policy, especially if officials in Washington are contemplating some form of military intervention. We would be opening a Pandora’s box of sectarian conflict that could easily spread to Lebanon, Israel, Kurdish areas of Iraq and elsewhere.

One irony of the current situation compared to thirty years ago is Iraq’s role. Then, we had reasonably good information that Saddam Hussein was supporting the Brotherhood with arms, explosives and facilitating the smuggling of both across the Syrian-Iraqi border. Today, the Maliki government in Baghdad appears to be supporting the Assad regime. And thirty years ago, we also had information that the Brotherhood leadership was given sanctuary in Jordan by King Hussein and in Saudi Arabia.

I don’t think we know how to play in this arena, just as we don’t understand how to play in the Afghanistan-Pakistan arena. US military intervention, whether under the guise of NATO or some other umbrella, could have serious unforeseen consequences for the US, Europe and the region. Officials in Washington should have the law of unforeseen consequences hammered into their heads every morning.”

These thoughts are from a US diplomat with direct and fairly recent experience in Syria. Why don’t we ever hear similarly sober assessments from the figures in Washington? Part of the reason, of course, is the over-politicization of the policy-making process, which has long been wrested from the hands of able area experts and delivered into the arms of hawks, ideologues and politicians building campaign warchests.

It is worth mentioning that much of the US administration’s focus on Syria derives from its unhealthy fixation on Iran. In supporting Iran’s worldview that US and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East must end, Syria has put itself in the crosshairs of American policy priorities.

The New York Times’ David Sanger wrote shortly after the Arab Awakening had devoured its first two dictators, Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak:

“Every decision — from Libya to Yemen to Bahrain to Syria — is being examined under the prism of how it will affect what was, until mid-January, the dominating calculus in the Obama administration’s regional strategy: how to slow Iran’s nuclear progress, and speed the arrival of opportunities for a successful uprising there.”

Efforts to undermine Bashar Assad’s government were a longstanding policy objective, even in the years before popular revolts hit the wider Middle East in 2011. WikiLeaks has revealed a veritable goldmine of information about Washington’s interventions in Syria, which include direct US financial assistance to opposition groups.

Dirty politics and geopolitical mudslinging aside, at the heart of this matter rests an issue that is fundamental to good policy-making: When do handy narratives simply become lies that spawn bad policies?

This WikiLeaks cable from 2006 illustrates Washington’s efforts to identify “opportunities” to expose “vulnerabilities” in the Syrian regime and cause sectarian/ethnic division, discord within the military/security apparatus and economic hardship. How will the US achieve this? The cable lists a whole host of Syrian vulnerabilities to be exploited, and then recommends:

“These proposals will need to be fleshed out and converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move quickly to take advantage of such opportunities. Many of our suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more indirect means to send messages that influence the inner circle.”

Propagandizing the American Public
Public Diplomacy, in effect, means propaganda – which under the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 specifies the terms in which the US government can disseminate information to foreign audiences. In 1972, the Act prohibited domestic access to information intended for foreign audiences – in other words, it became illegal for the US government to propagandize Americans.

But Washington has found many ways around this. After all, US citizens need to be “on board” the myriad overseas military adventures undertaken by successive administrations. How, then, does government stay within the confines of the law while propagandizing Americans so that they are pumped up for wars (Iraq, Afghanistan, maybe Iran), weapons sales to questionable allies (Saudi Arabia and Israel), and human rights violations (Guantanamo, drones)?

The fake story of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) targeting the US and its allies was an essential narrative in the build-up to military intervention in Iraq. Recall then-Secretary of State Colin Powell’s testimony about evidence of Saddam’s WMD activities and President George W. Bush’s State of the Union speech when he falsely accused Iraq of procuring yellowcake uranium from Niger – the media scrutiny of these statements was wholly justified: it is illegal to lie to the American people.

Officials are careful about how they circumvent the restrictions of Smith-Mundt. The quickest way to feed Americans inaccurate, tainted or sometimes entirely false information is through “leaks.” Peruse any newspaper of record in Washington, New York or Los Angeles and you will see the foreign news sections chock full of leaks from “officials.”

The internet, too, is a natural playground for the dissemination of disinformation. Its vast reach across the globe, its millions of blogs with varying credibility – these lend themselves well to the game of public diplomacy.

Powell’s former Chief of Staff Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson – another ex-official who has spoken candidly about policy and process shortcomings since leaving his post – told me in April 2010: “(Defense Secretary Donald) Rumsfeld and others, for example, just ignored the law. They would put a story in a Sydney newspaper, for example, and then ‘internet it’ back to the United States. So you’re propagandizing the American people.”

Wilkerson insists: “we have a statutory divergence that needs to be fixed first – legislation that says you can’t mix public affairs, which is aimed at the American people, and public diplomacy, which is aimed at the international audience. We need to stop propaganda, period. We need to tell the truth. I understand we don’t give out state secrets, but why don’t we tell the truth?”

The problem with foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, is ultimately about the kinds of people making the decisions – ideologues with clear agendas: against Iran and for Israel; against the Syrian “dictator” but in favor of the Saudi, Bahraini, Yemeni, Qatari ones; against Iranian nuclear capability, defending 200 nukes in Israel; abusing UN veto power (80+ times), deriding others for exercising a veto (Russia, China), and so on and so forth.

“It’s broken – it’s utterly dysfunctional,” Wilkerson says about the decision-making process in government: “They put ideologues in to corral, corner, orchestrate, cajole, push, wheedle the civil servants into doing something that they think ought to be done.”

Back to Syria.

A reporter from a major western cable news network just emailed me about his visit to Syria: “I got back from Homs last month unconvinced that the country was rising up against the Assad regime, and far from convinced that there are any good guys.”

Very little is known about what’s going on in the country. And it is not necessarily because there is limited media there: the Arab League mission report lists 147 foreign and Arab media organizations in Syria. The reason we still do not know what is taking place in Homs is because there is a ferocious battle for narratives between two rigid political mindsets. And the current dominant narrative is the one coming out of Washington – which, according to Wikileaks, has been waiting for “opportunities” to seize upon “vulnerabilities” to undermine the regime of Bashar Assad.

Not give us the truth, mind you. But to pursue a policy objective that US citizens have not agreed upon because they are unaware of the facts.

This article was first published on Al Akhbar English’s blog on February 10, 2012

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Assad in a rare public appearance in Ummayyad Square, Damascus

By Sharmine Narwani – The New York Times, February 6, 2012

Commentators on the Arab Awakening sometimes make the mistake of assuming that 22 Arab states are one and the same, all destined to oust dictators with the same sequence of events that follow either the Tunisian or Libyan models.

While President Bashar al-Assad has made some gross miscalculations since the crisis began in March, he is still favored by a slight majority of Syrians, according to recent online polls. But popularity is not why his government remains intact. The regime still enjoys the support of its key constituencies: the army, the major cities, the business/regime elite, minorities and Sunni secularists, with limited defections of the sort experienced by other Arab states.

On the flip side, after 11 months, the opposition still remains fundamentally divided along ethnic, religious, political and geographic lines, and is unable to articulate a detailed political platform. Furthermore, the armed opposition groups – brought to light in the recent Arab League mission report – lack a central command, are locally based, and have limited, irregular access to the military supply lines essential for operating on a larger scale.

Also, external parties have very little leverage in Syria. The country has adapted to living under sanctions and has a small but cohesive group of allies on which it relies. It functions largely without the web of dependencies typical of other Arab states, does not have a national debt problem, and has recently gained a valuable buffer from the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which insist on Syria resolving its crisis internally.

The view from inside Syria, meanwhile, varies starkly from the narratives spun outside. A closer look at the U.N. death toll of 5,000 shows a critical lack of discernment between pro-regime and opposition casualties, and fails to highlight the 2,000 dead regular soldiers whose funerals are televised daily within the country. In contrast to external opposition figures, mainstream domestic ones — even those who seek regime change — tend to reject sanctions, military solutions and foreign intervention in favor of a peaceful political resolution of the crisis.

If Assad delivers a new constitution and national elections by the summer, it may be all the space he needs to confound his critics. Increased militarization and sectarianism are likely to cement opinions rather than fragment: People may yearn not so much for bread, but for the ability to walk to the market and buy it.

This short essay was in response to a query posed by The New York Times: “Throughout an 11-month uprising, how has Syria’s leader outlasted his peers in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere? Is Assad’s time running out?” Fellow debaters include Andrew Tabler, Ed Husain and Anne-Marie Slaughter.

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Arab League observers in Syria don orange vests for identification

By Sharmine Narwani

On December 19, 2011 the Syrian Arab Republic and the Arab League signed a protocol establishing an Observer Mission that would lead efforts to resolve the conflict in Syria and protect civilians in the process.

Almost immediately afterward, once-staunch advocates of this Arab League “intervention” in Syria began efforts instead to undermine the Mission’s efforts.

Before inking the final deal, an Arab League official had warned me that certain member states – Qatar, most prominently – were setting up conditions that would preclude the participation of the Syrian government. But intense shuttle diplomacy at the eleventh hour produced a breakthrough: the Mission was approved by the two parties, and the disappointed spoilers launched a public relations blitz to cast doubt on the Mission’s participants, the Arab League’s capabilities and the investigation’s discoveries.

For the last month, we have heard allegations fly riotously about the Sudanese Head of Mission Lieutenant General Mohamed Ahmed Mustafa Al-Dabi, now suddenly accused of war crimes. Rumors abounded about Mission Observers quitting their posts because of the “horrific” nature of the Syrian government’s onslaught against its civilians. International NGOs and a slew of western politicians even offered to “train” the mission observers – implicitly suggesting that Arabs lack observation and negotiation capabilities, or worse perhaps, that the observers need to be taught to view the Syrian conflict through external lenses.

It was hard to doubt these rumors entirely – the Arab League have, after all, refused to make the final Monitors’ report available to the general media. But the Report has suddenly popped up as an annex to the UN Resolution on Syria currently being hotly debated at the Security Council. Most puzzling though, is that few Western or Arab journalists congregated at the United Nations this week are drawing attention to this critical document that provides insight into the very events contested at Council sessions.

Mission Report: The Good, Bad and Ugly
The full Monitor’s Report of the Arab League, revealed here, refers in several instances to efforts aimed at undermining the Mission and its activities:

“Since it began its work, the Mission has been the target of a vicious media campaign…that increased in intensity after the observers’ deployment. Some media outlets have published unfounded statements, which they attributed to the Head of the Mission. They have also grossly exaggerated events…Such contrived reports have helped to increase tensions among the Syrian people and undermined the observers’ work. Some media organizations were exploited in order to defame the Mission and its Head and cause the Mission to fail.”

The effort to “defame” the Mission – ostensibly by opponents of the Syrian government – is a strange one. The Report – while short – is professionally written, detailed, and highlights the difficulties inherent in covering a hard-fought conflict. It also criticizes the Syrian regime’s actions and shortcomings in sticking to the Protocol and protecting civilians:

“On being assigned to their zones and starting work, the observers witnessed acts of violence perpetrated by Government forces and an exchange of gunfire with armed elements in Homs and Hama. As a result of the Mission’s insistence on a complete end to violence and the withdrawal of Army vehicles and equipment, this problem has receded.”

On the critical issue of political detainees, The Mission Report states:

“On 19 January 2012, the Syrian government stated that 3569 detainees had been released from military and civil prosecution services. The Mission verified that 1669 of those detained had thus far been released. It continues to follow up the issue with the Government and the opposition, emphasizing to the Government side that the detainees should be released in the presence of observers so that the event can be documented.”

The Report also verifies that an additional 3,843 detainees were released before Syrian President Bashar Assad issued a general amnesty decree on January 15. The government claims the number is 4,035.

But then the Report veers sharply away from conventional narratives about the nature of the Syrian conflict by observing: “The Mission determined that there is an armed entity that is not mentioned in the protocol.”

Though the Report attributes this development “to the excessive use of force by Syrian Government forces in response to protests,” it also points out that “in some zones, this armed entity reacted by attacking Syrian security forces and citizens, causing the Government to respond with further violence.”

The Mission Report then provides several examples of this:

“In Homs and Dera’a, the Mission observed armed groups committing acts of violence against Government forces, resulting in death and injury among their ranks. In certain situations, Government forces responded to attacks against their personnel with force. The observers noted that some of the armed groups were using flares and armour-piercing projectiles.”

“In Homs, Idlib and Hama, the Observer Mission witnessed acts of violence being committed against Government forces and civilians that resulted in several deaths and injuries. Examples of those acts include the bombing of a civilian bus, killing eight persons and injuring others, including women and children, and the bombing of a train carrying diesel oil. In another incident in Homs, a police bus was blown up, killing two police officers. A fuel pipeline and some small bridges were also bombed.”

Media Coverage and Access In Syria
Notable too is the Mission Report’s contention that media reports on incidents of violence in Syria are often exaggerated and unverified:

“The Mission noted that many parties falsely reported that explosions or violence had occurred in several locations. When the observers went to those locations, they found that those reports were unfounded. The Mission also noted that, according to its teams in the field, the media exaggerated the nature of the incidents and the number of persons killed in incidents and protests in certain towns.”

The Mission Report also addresses criticism that the Syrian government restricts media access both into Syria and into the country’s hot spots. Complaints varied from media being allowed into the country for an insufficient “four days” to the regime demanding cumbersome “destination” itineraries, “operating permits” and “movement restrictions.”

The Report provides a list naming the various individual journalists and media organizations entering Syria during the Mission’s mandate, and concludes: “The Government had accredited 147 Arab and foreign media organizations. Some 112 of those organizations entered Syrian territory, joining the 90 other accredited organizations operating in Syria through their full-time correspondents.”

I should note that I was in Syria doing research for some articlesduring the Mission’s investigations and that I am not on the list. While my own visa was arranged through a connected non-Syrian friend, I know of other writers who entered the country without incident.  I spent my time there freely interviewing many opposition groups and individuals and was at no time accompanied by government minders – or monitored, to the best of my knowledge.

Less fortunate was Gilles Jacqiuer, the France 2 Channel cameraman who was killed during a visit to a pro-regime neighborhood in Homs. The French government has loudly sought to implicate the Syrian government in this killing, but the Mission investigated the incident and concluded that “Mission reports from Homs indicate that the French journalist was killed by opposition mortar shells.”

The Report also refers to controversial statements made by several Monitors who abandoned their positions and publically criticized the Mission afterward. Probably the most memorable of these is Algerian Anwar Malek who famously claimed on Al Jazeera: “What I saw was a humanitarian disaster…The regime is not just committing one war crime, but a series of crimes against its people. The snipers are everywhere, shooting at civilians. People are being kidnapped. Prisoners are being tortured and none were released.”

The Arab League released a terse statement in response, saying Malek’s allegation “does not relate to the truth in any way,” and claiming instead, that “since he was assigned to the Homs team, Malek did not leave the hotel for six days and did not go out with the rest of the team into the field giving the excuse that he was sick.”

The Mission Report further expounds: “Some observers reneged on their duties and broke the oath they had taken. They made contact with officials from their countries and gave them exaggerated accounts of events. Those officials consequently developed a bleak and unfounded picture of the situation.”

Mission Success or Failure?
The Report concludes with some pessimism: because of early logistical and other difficulties, the Mission only actually operated for 23 days out of its month-long mandate. There is a need for better transportation, communication equipment – and most importantly – the necessary “media and political support” to complete its mandate.

On a positive note, the Mission stresses that the Syrian regime “strived to help it succeed in its task and remove any barriers that might stand in its way. The Government also facilitated meetings with all parties. No restrictions were placed on the movement of the Mission and its ability to interview Syrian citizens, both those who opposed the Government and those loyal to it.”

Most critically, however, the Report recommends a change in the Protocol’s mandate, namely, the “commitment of all sides to cease all acts of violence.” This, for the first time, introduces the notion that the Syrian government may not be entirely responsible for the civilian casualty numbers flaunted in media reports. And it is an important point – regular soldiers reportedly account for approximately 2,000 deaths in the country since March 2011.

But observers warn: “Recently, there have been incidents that could widen the gap and increase bitterness between the parties. These incidents can have grave consequences and lead to the loss of life and property. Such incidents include the bombing of buildings, trains carrying fuel, vehicles carrying diesel oil and explosions targeting the police, members of the media and fuel pipelines. Some of those attacks have been carried out by the Free Syrian Army and some by other armed opposition groups.”

The “citizens” of Syria with whom they met – some of whom suffer from “extreme tension, oppression and injustice” – “believe the crisis should be resolved peacefully through Arab mediation alone, without international intervention. Doing so would allow them to live in peace and complete the reform process and bring about the change they desire.”

This is a narrative that is entirely missing in the mainstream media’s coverage of the Syrian crisis. The complicity of armed groups in escalating the violence initially started by Syrian government; the compliance of the regime in advancing the Arab League Protocol’s demands; the rejection by ordinary citizens of internationalizing and militarizing the conflict.

Read the Mission Report. Conclude what you will. But admit that possibly the worst thing that can be done at this critical juncture is to suspend the Arab League Mission’s investigations and interventions. If the Mission is halted, civilians will lose protection in this conflict, facts will be hard to come by, and intermediaries on the ground in Syria will be nonexistent. Violence escalated after the Mission took its leave to file the Report. Inserting them back into the ring is unarguably the right course of action, particularly as it appears the UN Security Council is, today, at an impasse.

The author blogs on Al Akhbar English and the Huffington Post

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Aftermath of the Midan bombing that left 26 dead and dozens more wounded

January 2012:

Crossing over the Lebanese border into Syria was anticlimactic. The lines of people waiting to have their papers checked did not look markedly shorter than during my two previous visits, both having taken place well before popular Arab revolts broke out across the Middle East.

Even security checks — looking into the trunk of our car and the kinds of questions asked by immigration personnel — appeared, if anything, less probing than my earlier experiences.

But two things caught my notice. Posters vilifying certain media networks — Al Jazeera, Saudi-owned Al Arabiya, and the BBC — dotted the walls of the border crossing. One to the right of the counter for “foreigners” hovered over the head of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) crew in line in front of me. Ah, I thought — the rumors that foreign journalists are now trickling into Syria may be accurate.

The second noteworthy detail was the whispers among border personnel that a busload of Syrian soldiers being transported from their barracks had been bombed by a roadside IED — near Zabadani, a town now claimed by the armed opposition. I have no confirmation of this.

I was worried about my stay in Damascus in the Christian quarter of the Old City. Just four days earlier, on a Friday, a suicide bomber had detonated explosives in a crowded area in Midan — inside the capital — apparently targeting a bus of policemen, although the casualties were mostly civilians.

I was keen to see if there were tangible ramifications of this act of terror in the heart of Damascus — 10 months into the protests, the city is still largely viewed as being supportive of the government. Damascus counts. No uprising will be complete unless this city of 2.6 million shifts that balance. The capitol will eventually have to be a battlefield for any revolt to succeed, even if only a political one.

Syria is icy cold this time of year, which may account for some of the empty streets that are normally bustling with humanity. But the Friday after the suicide bombing, the streets were noticeably devoid of people, cars were minimal — the city, quiet. Friday, the Muslim day of prayer, is usually spent with family, so it wasn’t altogether clear if the stillness was due to the previous week’s violence.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s voice greeted us on the radio as my friend and I drove into the country a few days earlier. He was delivering his fifth speech since protests broke out in March last year. It was long-winded and my companion translated every so often. I waited impatiently for these tidbits which lasted well after we were sipping tea in a Damascus hotel lobby — guests and conference attendees crowding around the TV screens to pass their judgments.

Later that day I met with the first on my list of regime opponents, most of whom had served prison terms at some point in their lives. I will write in more detail about these men and women later, but they varied from those who desired an overhaul of the regime while keeping Assad’s presidency intact, to those who would not consider dialogue with any part of the existing government. There were some commonalities. All rejected any foreign military intervention and the militarization of the protests. The majority were scathing about the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and external opposition groups like the Syrian National Council (SNC), so liberally quoted by the Western media as the definitive voice of the Syrian “opposition.”

“Their decisions are made in America and Turkey,” said one regime critic about the foreign-based Syrian opposition. “I want decisions made in Syria.”

Another one parried: “The external opposition are not an effective part of the opposition. They don’t participate in any political parties here. We want to change the system in a safe way — we don’t want to pay a higher price than necessary. We want national cohesion, we don’t want a collapse of the economy and we don’t want to lose our sovereignty.”

Most of these domestic-based opposition figures I met were disparaging about international sanctions too: “Life is very expensive for the Syrian people now and (the sanctions) will take the country into a vicious cycle of poverty and violence and harm the democratic transition,” says Louay Hussein, leader of the Building the Syrian State movement, who spent seven years in prison during his 20s.

“Sanctions will not affect the authorities, but will affect the people,” claims retired political economist Aref Dalila, an organizer of the 2000-1 Damascus Spring (a period of unusual political and social openness in Syria immediately following Hafez al Assad’s death) who was released from a seven-year prison term in 2008. “People are already paying a high cost – prices have risen dramatically, factories have shut down, imports have decreased by around half and unemployment has risen, especially in the tourism sector.”

Too true. I was the only guest staying in the charming 17th century converted Damascene house nestled along narrow cobblestone streets in Damascus’ Old City. The famed boutique hotel with intricately painted ceilings and carved mother-of-pearl-encrusted wooden doors is usually impossible to book.

The only apparent benefit of sanctions was that I could sit in my pajamas for my morning tea and croissant in the hotel’s petite courtyard, unencumbered by chiding looks from other guests or staff. There was one woman manning the place during the day, replaced by a gentleman in the evening. My second night there, he called me at 3 am when I had not yet returned to the hotel to check on my safety: “I was worried,” he said, “you know, because of what’s going on.”

Worried they may be, but that didn’t stop reportedly tens of thousands of Syrians flooding into Ummayyad Square – named after the Ummayyad Caliphate whose capital was Damascus – in support of their president earlier that day. A makeshift stage was erected in front of the imposing al-Assad Library, where supporters chanted pro-regime slogans and condemned the machinations of foreign leaders against the Syrian state. Qatar’s Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan were particularly singled out for derision.

The masses were in for a surprise though. Assad himself, accompanied by his wife Asma and two of their children, swung by to speak to the jubilant crowd – and some said also to quell long-circulating rumors that his family had fled Syria.

I had heard about this rally the night before from the young pro-Assad son of an anti-regime woman who had seen notices on Facebook. That surprised me – Facebook was not available, except via proxy websites, during my last visit. It had been re-introduced to Syrians in February 2011, the year of the Arab revolts.

I went to the square with low expectations. News reports in the West rarely cover pro-regime gatherings, and almost always suggest that participants are forced to attend, are engaging out of fear, or are bused in by the government – sometimes even paid to join the throngs.

I only managed to reach the square after the president’s departure, when many had already departed, and some were still trickling out of the square. Still, crowds lingered to chant pro-Assad songs, dance the traditional “dabke” and wave flags – including Hezbollah ones to mark support for the Resistance. They were women and men, young and old, religious and secular, soldiers and civilians, well-heeled and not – certainly, none looked “forced” to participate in the gathering.

VIDEO OF RALLY IN UMMAYYAD SQUARE

By comparison, take a look at this YouTube video of the same square ostensibly filmed during Assad’s speech. The square looks almost empty and it appears his voice has been added into the footage to suggest a low turnout even at the rally’s peak. I didn’t get to the square until after Assad’s departure, but even then, you can see the stark difference in crowd size between the two video clips – a testament to the ferocity of the media battle for narratives over Syria these days.

The celebrations went on long after my frozen hands decided to seek refuge indoors. An earlier meeting had been postponed because of road blocks around the square that cut off access to many parts of the city, so I met up instead with Ammar Ismail, persona non grata in the Western hemisphere and an online activist in the cyberwar over Syrian narratives.

Ismail leads a frenzied online presence via his web-based Damascus News Network (DNN) available on Facebook. Through video footage, pictures and articles, the social media site offers counter-narratives to Western-dominated ones on Syria, but Ismail, a self-proclaimed nationalist, is often critical of the regime too.

He claims a news article referring to him as the “head of the Syrian Electronic Army” caught the notice of the European Union, which accuses Ismail of hacking websites on behalf of the Syrian government – allegedly because “its IP addresses indicate that it is collocated in facilities which belong to the Syrian government,” according to a CNN Article. He was one of a handful of Syrian nationals whose assets were frozen by the EU in November – no hackers or cyberwarriors on the opposition side received similar punishment. A recent small venture to encourage cooperation between the Italian and Syrian textile industries suffered, and Ismail had to shutter the business.

In the past few days, Ismail has been forced to relocate his young family as a precaution against death threats. His son will have to be home-schooled for a while, he says, exclaiming: “how does my right to exercise freedom of speech become an issue for the EU?” Ismail plans to file legal proceedings against the European Union shortly.

Damascus is bizarrely open for a city that has been the target of opposition groups intent on splintering the regime by first swaying the capitol from its pro-regime bent. The internet is bustling with competing narratives, the airways open to the vilified foreign media networks accused by Assad’s government of fueling and propagandizing the protests.

Walk into a Damascene café or business and you are likely to see television screens broadcasting the pro-regime Addounia network or state-sponsored Al Ekhbariya Soriyah alongside the much-maligned Al Jazeera or US-backed Al Hurra. It almost seems like the regime is saying “bring us your worst – we have little to fear.”

A world away, in Homs, Deraa, Idlib, Douma, Zabadani and other Syrian hot spots the battle for narratives is harder fought, in cities and towns where people are reported to be dying in the dozens each day. I had a trip planned to some of these places – one that did not materialize after France 2 cameraman Gilles Jacquier was killed by a projectile whilst on a government-accompanied tour of Homs. But although I felt as though I might actually be safer in the immediate aftermath of Jacquier’s death, some apparently thought otherwise.

This Syrian conflict has layers and layers that we have not yet peeled within the pages of our sanctified newspapers and online repartees. I have seen very little verifiable professional reportage from the main areas of conflict. Most of the “storyline” is taking place in capital cities where competing governments appear determined to decide Syria’s future. The Syrian people are just fodder for their cannons – I am not sure their lives are even considered, as long as their bodies, alive or dead, lying on streets or plumping up rallies/protests, provide these storylines to feed into their vying narratives.

Damascus is inexpensive. The food – even in hole-in-the-wall cafes – is better than in most cities out for a quick tourist buck. The people are hospitable, even chivalrous. You feel safe walking the streets and talking to strangers. Today, people discuss politics in the open – that is surely a step up for the authoritarian state. The mood though, is cautious, worried and even angry. But the rage swings both ways – there are those to the right of the regime who are threatening to take up their own arms if the Syrian government does not protect them against opposition gunmen. While there appears to be a domestic stalemate today, that could easily turn if sectarian battles escalate. I have seen gruesome still photos of casualties that don’t inform me if the victim is Sunni, Christian, Kurd, Druze or Alawite, but the sheer volume of these photos and footage suggests to me that some in Syria now think nothing of making snuff films to further their narratives. Is the shooting soldier really a member of the regular armed forces or someone donning a uniform to make it appear so? Is the bearded guy with the weapon really a militarized gunman or is that a trick of the regime?

The answers may be a long time coming, but one thing is certain: there are efforts underway by both sides to sway public opinion, and that effort is not by any means limited to those inside Syria. What do the majority of Syrians want? That is still the million dollar question, and the answer appears to shift with each major development – sometimes with optimism, usually with pessimism. If I were to wager on the outcome of this crisis though, I would firmly place my bets on the Syrian people ousting these interventions and reaching their own national consensus on a democratic transition that ensures sovereignty. If civil war is to be averted, there are only a few options out of this conflict after all – and the one that offers the least chaos is the one most likely to appeal to the Syrian majority.

Published earlier in Al Akhbar English.

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Since the first public protests broke out in Syria last March, the narratives about the Syrian crisis have stayed fairly true to the theme of all the Arab Revolts. An authoritarian ruler out to crush peaceful opposition to his regime opens fire on civilians and the number of protestors skyrockets as the body count mounts…

But we are now entering the tenth month of this particular violent revolt – even Libya with its full-fledged civil war didn’t take so long. So what gives?

According to the Texas-based geopolitical risk analysis group Stratfor which released an eyebrow-raising piece on Syrian opposition propaganda efforts last week, “most of the opposition’s more serious claims have turned out to be grossly exaggerated or simply untrue, thereby revealing more about the opposition’s weaknesses than the level of instability inside the Syrian regime.”

This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it may be the first time a mainstream US-based intelligence-gathering firm openly questions the existing narrative on Syria. Secondly, Stratfor’s findings begs the question: what are we basing our policy initiatives on if our underlying assumptions are inaccurate?

How unstable is Syria, really? How widespread is opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad? The death-toll that has us riveted with disgust – today, the highest daily death rate yet – how accurate are those numbers? Who do they include and are they verifiable? Are local activists even capable of distinguishing between a dead pro-regime civilian and a dead anti-regime civilian – especially now that both sides are armed and firing?

I cannot begin to dispute those numbers and details, so I will not try. But I will ask the question: where are all the “facts” coming from?

Inherent Bias in Syrian Data?
The problem with information that originates from opposition groups is that there is a clear interest in disseminating “beneficial” data and underplaying “damaging” statistics. And that dynamic applies to the government too – which is why we take Syrian regime pronouncements with a grain of salt.

You don’t see the Syrian opposition taking an active role in publicizing the slaughter of rank-and-file soldiers, for instance – except to claim these forces are being shot for deserting the army. Twitter is abuzz right now with news that more than 70 of today’s 100+ dead are “deserters.”

Nor do you hear about the numbers of pro-regime civilians killed by the armed opposition – some of them allegedly while “demonstrating” in support of the Syrian regime.

Now, this does not mean that the Syrian opposition lies outright to gain sympathy and foreign support – mostly because the “opposition” is not homogenous and comes in different shapes, sizes and flavors.

But Strafor clearly questions the intent of some of these groups based on very recent evidence of disinformation campaigns:

The Stratfor article focuses primarily on opposition efforts to create the impression in the past few weeks that there is a significant split within President Assad’s own clan and within his Alawite minority sect, members of which man the top jobs in the country’s armed forces and key government positions.

Among these high-profile gaffs are a December 10 report alleging that “Syrian Deputy Defense Minister and former chief of military intelligence Asef Shawkat had been killed by his aide and former General Security Directorate chief, Gen. Ali Mamlouk.”

Stratfor posits that the unfounded “image of two senior-ranking Sunni members of the regime drawing guns on each other” helps to create ” a compelling narrative” for groups that wish “to undermine the perception that al Assad’s inner circle is united in the effort to suppress the opposition and save the regime.”

In yet another example, a December 9 statement published in the Saudi-owned Asharq al Awsat by the previously-unknown “Alawite League of Coordinating Committees” which claims to represent the Alawite community in Syria, “rejected any attempt to hold the Alawite sect responsible for the ‘barbarism’ of the al Assad regime.” Stratfor says the planted story gives “the impression that the Alawite community is fracturing and that the al Assad regime is facing a serious loss of support within its own minority sect.”

The US-based analysts then cite their own Syrian opposition source who “acknowledged that this group was in fact an invention of the Sunni opposition in Syria.”

On the same day, more mainstream opposition groups including the Syrian National Council (SNC), the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights began disseminating “claims that regime forces besieged Homs and imposed a 72-hour deadline for Syrian defectors to surrender themselves and their weapons or face a potential massacre.”

That news made international headlines – Homs has been the raging center of anti-regime dissent after all, with death tolls that appear to be well above those of other hotspots. Stratfor’s investigation, however, found “no signs of a massacre,” and warns that “opposition forces have an interest in portraying an impending massacre, hoping to mimic the conditions that propelled a foreign military intervention in Libya.”

The article then goes on to suggest that any suggestions of massacres are unlikely because the Syrian “regime has calibrated its crackdowns to avoid just such a scenario. Regime forces,” Stratfor argues, “have been careful to avoid the high casualty numbers that could lead to an intervention based on humanitarian grounds.”

And so on and so forth.

Wrongful Narratives Muddy The Waters
Stratfor identifies some clear objectives that drive propaganda efforts by Syrian opposition groups:

- Convincing Syrians inside Syria (going beyond the Sunni majority to include the minorities that have so far largely backed the regime) that the regime is splitting and therefore no longer worth supporting.

- Convincing external stakeholders, such as the United States, Turkey and France, that the regime is splitting and is prepared to commit massacres to put down the unrest, along the lines of what the regime carried out in 1982 in Hama.

- Convincing both Syrians and external stakeholders that the collapse of the al Assad regime will not result in the level of instability that has plagued Iraq for nearly a decade, or in the rise of Islamist militias, as appears to be happening in Libya. To this end, the FSA has emphasized its defensive operations and the defense of civilians to avoid being branded as militants. Meanwhile, the political opposition has stressed that it wants to keep state structures intact, so as to avoid the Iraq scenario of having to rebuild the state from scratch amid a sectarian war.

Stratfor points out that opposition groups have made headway in getting their messages out to the mainstream western media, and that these outlets regularly “quote casualty totals provided by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, without the ability to verify the information.” But the article also warns that “the lack of coordination among various opposition outlets and the unreliability of the reports threaten to undermine the credibility of the opposition as a whole.”

Syria today signed the Arab League protocol that will make way for a fact-finding mission. Provided that this important process does not get hijacked by regional politics – an unlikely scenario even with the best of intentions – we may start to see verifiable information about what is taking place inside the country.

Without facts, the Syrian story does not stand a chance in overcoming the enmity and rancor felt by both sides. False narratives, even heartfelt ones, will only keep conflict buzzing. Kudos to Stratfor for underlining the importance of information transparency.

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The ongoing diplomatic tug of war between Syria and the Arab League took an unexpected turn Monday with rumors of a potential breakthrough. A positive outcome would signal a major political – not procedural – change of heart at the Arab League, whose earlier dealings with Syria showed little room for compromise.

Last week, the Arab League broke with its own Charter for the second time this year, voting to impose far-reaching economic sanctions on member-state Syria – eight months after backing a no-fly zone over member-state Libya.

The Charter, which was written in the early post-colonial period, placed great stock in the inviolability of a “a state’s independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity.”

Article V of the League’s Charter clearly stipulates:

“Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes between two or more member-states of the League is prohibited. If there should arise among them a difference which does not concern a state’s independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory.”

A recently-departed senior Arab League official told me: “We have taken strong measures before only in relation to foreign policy issues or disputes between Arab countries. But on these last two occasions, this is a historic departure in relation to the practice of the Arab League. For the first time measures were taken against an Arab country because of its internal situation – the way a government is treating its own people.”

He continued: “When people are dying I don’t care about reconciling this with the Charter – that’s my priority. If there are legal issues that contravene, I’m happy to bend them.”

So sweet. But then I snap out of my reverie and think instead of the tens of thousands of civilians slaughtered in member-state Somalia this year alone, with nary a peep from the Arab League. Or of the League’s non-intervention in member-states Yemen and Bahrain, where protests continue to this day.

The official admitted: “I think the position taken by the Arab countries in relation with Bahrain is a very sad one – we should have been more firm.” On Yemen however, his response was curious: “Yemen – it is being handled by the GCC, and doesn’t need the Arab League’s help right now.”

The GCC as Regional Arbiters?
The six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman – which consist entirely of hereditary monarchies leading autocratic governments – have indeed been very proactive in dealing with the Arab Revolts, albeit almost exclusively with their own survival in mind.

Earlier this year, it was a bold Saudi Arabia that roared back against protesting Arabs, backing dictators and offering cash and cover to roll back these revolutions. The “Counter-Revolutionary Saudis” scorned the Americans for not supporting ousted dictators in Tunisia and Egypt – then commandeered efforts to guide and squash protests in Yemen and Bahrain.

Even Qatar and Oman, the two GCC nations with comparatively independent policy positions in the region, quickly shed that flexibility once the Arab Revolts hit home in the Persian Gulf.

Qatar, in particular, stands out as the one Arab nation to have formulated a proactive plan to deal with these revolts. It has thrown money, clout and military force behind ensuring desirable outcomes. So far its goal appears to be two-fold: backing Islamists to replace secular regimes, and thwarting the influence of all other competing regional power centers while it goes about its plans.

And unlike Saudi Arabia, its long-term rival in the Persian Gulf, the tiny emirate kingdom is not trying to thwart change at all. Rather, it is proactively leading a selective strategy to remake the wider Middle East in its own image.

Via its Al-Jazeera satellite news channel and its own brand of shuttle diplomacy, Doha has fanned the flames of revolt in Tunisia and Egypt, led the charge on NATO intervention in Libya, backed a quieter strategy to allow minimal, incremental change in it own backyard with Yemen and Bahrain, and has done everything in its power to unseat Syria Bashar al Assad from the word “go.”

Consider this: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – now effectively helming Syria issues at the Arab League – spent seven months negotiating an exit for the despotic Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh

But the same players refused to spend even seven days on Syria.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notes the discrepancy too: “All states, including those who have demanded to take some action against Syria, have taken a totally different approach towards Yemen, where negotiations on a peaceful plan proposed by the GCC have lasted for months,” he said, warning “an ultimatum that some states, including Arab League members, have been trying to resort to, cannot resolve the problem.”

The Arab League’s Syria “Game?”
When Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem contacted Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi a few months back, it was “to try to gain some time to find a way out of this crisis,” according to a Syrian source.

A senior Arab League official who would not speak on the record, claims that the Syria initiative was steered away from its original form by “some of the ministers who didn’t like the direction and started dictating certain ideas that they knew Syria would not accept.”

Qatar, whose Prime/Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani chairs the Arab League’s committee on Syria, could have produced a more constructive outcome, if it wished. Instead, says the official, the “Protocol” to create a League observer delegation was forwarded with an ultimatum “in a short time, which we have never experienced in the history of diplomacy at the Arab League. Why not do this right? This is needed not only for Syria – why not a plan for everywhere in the region?”

“The whole process was meant to gain a refusal, to move to the second stage of this game,” warns the official. What is this next stage? Al-Thani himself may have offered that answer when he hinted that the League could itself seek international intervention “if the Syrians do not take us seriously.”

Nobody is guiding the Arab League’s actions today more than this one-man Qatari tsunami. The Arabic-language press was agog with the tongue-lashing Al-Thani delivered his Algerian counterpart at a Syria-related meeting on November 12:

“Stop defending Syria because when your turn comes you may need us!” he allegedly roared at Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci when the latter registered an objection.

Yet the Qatari PM managed to feign regret in public when he announced last weekend: “Today, we are very sad to hold such a meeting as the Syrian government has not signed the observer mission.”

But here’s the rub. Syria had already agreed in principle to the Arab League’s plans, contingent on some amendments that would preserve its sovereignty. The League refused, claiming that these would “affect the core of the document and would radically change the nature of the mission.”

But is that true? Would Syria’s amendments sink the project as some League members alleged?

Much ado has been made about Syria’s amendments in Arab League statements, but other than a brief reference to a couple of provisions the Arabic-language press, these have not been made public until now.

Below is a more comprehensive outline of Syria’s counter proposal obtained from a well-connected, non-Syrian source. There is little in the document that could not have been negotiated to accommodate both Syria’s desire to maintain sovereignty in this process and the Arab League’s determination to carry out its mission:

Syria’s Amendments to the Arab League Monitoring Mission

November 2011

Clause I

“An independent Mission is to be formed, composed of Arab military and civilian personnel nominated by Arab states and organizations involved in human rights and the provision of protection to civilians, to be sent to the Syrian Arab Republic. It will be known as the Arab League Monitoring Mission and operate within its framework. It is assigned with monitoring implementation of the Arab plan for resolving the Syrian crisis and providing protection to Syrian civilians.”

Syrian amendment:

“An independent Mission is to be formed, composed of Arab military and civilian personnel nominated by Arab states, to be sent to the Syrian Arab Republic. It will be known as the Arab League Monitoring Mission and operate within its framework. It is assigned with monitoring implementation of the clauses of the Arab plan for resolving the current crisis in Syria. The Syrian side will be provided with a list comprising the names, status, ranks and nationalities of the Mission’s members. “

Clause II

“The Mission will start work immediately after Syria signs this Protocol. It will initially dispatch a delegation consisting of the Head of the Mission and an adequate number of monitors (between 30 and 50), supported by an appropriate number of administrative staff and sufficient security personnel to provide personal protection to members of the Mission.”

Syrian amendment:

“The Mission will start work immediately after Syria signs this Protocol. It will initially dispatch a delegation consisting of the Head of the Mission and an adequate number of monitors, supported by an appropriate number of administrative staff.”

Clause II – Subclause

“The number of monitors will be determined by the Head of the Mission, in consultation with the Secretary-General, in accordance with his assessment of the Mission’s requirements to perform its task of monitoring the Syrian government’s compliance with its commitments to protecting civilians in the fullest manner. The Secretary-General may call on technical assistance and observers from Arab, Islamic and friendly states in carrying out the tasks assigned to the Mission.”

Syrian amendment:

“The number of monitors will be determined by the Head of the Mission, in consultation with the Secretary-General and in coordination with Syria, in accordance with his assessment of the Mission’s requirements in performing its task of monitoring the Syrian government’s compliance with its commitments in the fullest manner. The Secretary-General may call on technical assistance and observers from Arab states in carrying out the tasks assigned to the Mission.”

Clause III, Subclause 3

“To verify the release of those detained due to the current events.”

Syrian amendment:

“To verify the phased release of those detained due to the current events who were not involved in crimes of murder or acts of sabotage.”

Clause III, Subclause 4

“To confirm the withdrawal and evacuation of military and armed forces from cities and residential areas which witnessed, or are witnessing, demonstrations and protests.”

Syrian amendment:

“To confirm the withdrawal and evacuation of military and armed forces from cities and residential areas.”

Clause III, Subclause 7

“The Mission will have full freedom of movement, and the freedom to make whatever visits or contacts it considers appropriate, in relation to matters pertaining to its tasks and modus operandi with regard to the provision of protection for civilians.”

Syrian amendment:

“The Mission will have full freedom of movement, and the freedom to make whatever visits or contacts it considers appropriate, in relation to matters pertaining to its tasks and modus operandi, in coordination with the Syrian side.”

Clause IV, Subclause 2

“Access and freedom of movement will be granted to all members of the Mission to all parts of the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic at the times specified by the Mission.”

Syrian amendment:

“Access and freedom of movement will be granted to all members of the Mission in coordination with the Syrian side.”

Clause IV, Subclause 5

“To guarantee that no person, or member of their family, will be punished, harassed or compromised — in any form whatsoever — as a result of having contact with the Mission or providing it with testimony or information.”

Syrian amendment:

“To guarantee that no person will be punished or subjected to pressure — in any form whatsoever — as a result of having contact with the Mission or providing it with testimony or information.”

In addition, the Syrian government wanted the following two points added to the Protocol:

1.”This protocol is valid for two months from the date of signature, renewable with the consent of both sides”
2. “The Syrian government will not incur any financial costs as a result of the Mission performing its task.”

The League needs to start as it means to continue. Consistent, lawful and devoid of double standards.

We are witnessing a dangerous willingness among the global political elite to circumvent rule of law, territorial integrity and sovereignty to jostle for positioning in the emerging Middle East order. Tolerating aerial bombardment of civilians by foreign forces and dragging the body of a deposed head of state through the streets are an indication of creeping lawlessness – much of which appears to be tacitly accepted by the “international community.”

This is unquestionably a new era in the Arab League. The organization is being thrust into a regional decision making role – without any history of competence or effectiveness – during a time when the Arab world is experiencing seismic shifts. Is the Arab League capable of rising to this challenge? Or will it remain an institution that rubber-stamps the policies of its most powerful members?

A version of this article was first published on Al Akhbar English

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For Middle East watchers, the revelation that a major head of state called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “liar” is, well, not exactly news. French president Nicholas Sarkozy needs to get in line behind the many other politicians who have thrown up their arms over Netanyahu’s unusual – even for politics – propensity for duplicity.

Former Clinton White House Spokesman Joe Lockhart, in his book “The Truth About Camp David” calls the Israeli prime minister, “one of the most obnoxious individuals you’re going to come into – just a liar and a cheat. He could open his mouth and you could have no confidence that anything that came out of it was the truth.”

The latest brouhaha over Netanyahu’s character emerged at the G-20 meeting in Cannes last week, when reporters unintentionally caught three minutes of candid conversation between Sarkozy and US President Barack Obama. Here is the conversation according to the New York Times:

“I cannot stand him,” Mr. Sarkozy was quoted as saying. “He is a liar.”
Mr. Obama is reported to have replied, “You’re fed up with him, but I have to deal with him every day!”

My reaction was two-fold. Firstly, why does the president of the United States have to “deal” with Netanyahu “every day?” Israel’s strategic value to the United States has never been less apparent at a time when its pariah value is on the rise globally. In 2010, this thinking entered the political mainstream when CENTCOM’s then- commander General David Petraeus and US Vice President Joe Biden publicly suggested that the Jewish state may even be a liability in certain vital policy areas.

Nobody underlines the liability of our alliance with Israel better than Chas Freeman – Obama’s choice to head the National Intelligence Council – who was very publicly opposed by the Israel lobby during his nomination process. During a Nixon Center speech in July 2010, Freeman explained:

“[Israel] is so estranged from everyone else in the Middle East that no neighboring country will accept flight plans that originate in or transit it. Israel is therefore useless in terms of support for American power projection. It has no allies other than us. It has developed no friends. Israeli participation in our military operations would preclude the cooperation of many others… The need to protect Israel from mounting international indignation about its behavior continues to do grave damage to our global and regional standing. It has severely impaired our ties with the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims. These costs to our international influence, credibility, and leadership are, I think, far more serious than the economic and other burdens of the relationship.”

But Obama isn’t the only US president to bemoan the constant need to coddle both Israel and its irritating prime minister, in particular. Scroll back to Bill Clinton’s presidency, which coincided with Netanyahu’s first gig as head of state…

According to ex-special envoy to the Middle East Aaron David Miller, Clinton was so agitated by Netanyahu during their first meeting in 1996, he exploded: “Who the fuck does he think he is? Who’s the fucking superpower here?”

Barely a year later, Clinton had to personally wrest from Netanyahu an antidote for the toxin used by Israeli agents in their assassination attempt on Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal. “I cannot deal with this man. He is impossible,” Clinton allegedly said in reference to Netanyahu, who initially lied about his involvement in the murder plot.

But these cannot possibly compare to Netanyahu’s big “gotcha” moment where he is caught on camera telling a settler family that he deliberately deceived his partners in peace over the Oslo Accords:

Woman: The Oslo Accords are a disaster.

Netanyahu: Yes. You know that and I knew that…The people [nation] has to know…
What were the Oslo Accords? The Oslo Accords, which the Knesset signed, I was asked, before the elections: “Will you act according to them?” and I answered: “yes, subject to mutuality and limiting the retreats.” “But how do you intend to limit the retreats?” “I’ll give such interpretation to the Accords that will make it possible for me to stop this galloping to the ’67 [armistice] lines. How did we do it?

Narrator: The Oslo Accords stated at the time that Israel would gradually hand over territories to the Palestinians in three different pulses, unless the territories in question had settlements or military sites. This is where Netanyahu found a loophole.

Netanyahu: No one said what defined military sites. Defined military sites, I said, were security zones. As far as I’m concerned, the Jordan Valley is a defined military site.

Woman: Right [laughs]…The Beit She’an Valley.

Netanyahu: How can you tell. How can you tell? But then the question came up of just who would define what Defined Military Sites were. I received a letter – to my and to Arafat, at the same time – which said that Israel, and only Israel, would be the one to define what those are, the location of those military sites and their size. Now, they did not want to give me that letter, so I did not give the Hebron Agreement. I stopped the government meeting, I said: “I’m not signing.” Only when the letter came, in the course of the meeting, to my and to Arafat, only then did I sign the Hebron Agreement. Or rather, ratify it, it had already been signed. Why does this matter? Because at that moment I actually stopped the Oslo Accord.”

Is this why Bill Clinton in September admitted that it was Netanyahu, and not the Palestinians, who killed the peace process?

I have to admit a personal interest in Netanyahu’s lies, the subject of one of my very first Huffington Post pieces in 2009: “Netanyahu’s Shame and the Fiction He Weaves.” I have met the man and caught him in a lie back in the early 90s when he was still a deputy in the foreign ministry – this one was about Soviet immigrants and East Jerusalem settlements. One notices this man over other politicians: Netanyahu is smarmy through and through – Ariel Sharon felt avuncular in comparison.

But let’s go back to to the Sarkozy-Obama conversation for a moment. While Mideast veterans are well-versed in the duplicitous shenanigans of Israel’s current prime minister, the general public is probably not. This was an important admission by two staunch allies of Israel. It is not just Netanyahu they cover for – he is just a symptom of a long-ingrained habit of providing cover for Israel’s many, many myths, narratives and fairytales.

“This was a swamp, we made it a garden. There were no inhabitants here before the Jews arrived. Palestinians are terrorists, they teach their children to become suicide bombers, they have no value for life,” etc. The big one today is that although Israel tries, Palestinians don’t want peace. Columbia University’s Joseph Massad exposes these systemic untruths in a prescient article published recently on Al Jazeera – a must-read for anyone genuinely interested in Israel’s fact-building industry.

But here’s my second reaction. If Netanyahu lies and our leaders know it, why should we believe anything he says about Israel’s intentions for peace, Iran’s nuclear aspirations, Hamas terrorism, or anything else for that matter?

The guy’s a liar. Time to take away his platform.

Analysts and pundits have spent the past two weeks puzzling over the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate a Saudi diplomat in Washington – in part because of a complete lack of either motive or benefit for the Islamic Republic. Iran, reputed to place much stock in cost-benefit analyses in its geopolitical calculations, clearly fails to gain materially or politically from any part of the allegations thus far. So what gives?

Instead of scrutinizing the “whys” of Iran’s involvement, it may be more illuminating to examine Washington’s motivation in advancing this bit of political theater. The criminal charges were followed by high-profile statements and sanctioned leaks from the White House, the US Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Defense, the FBI and CIA, all well orchestrated for maximum impact. The U.S. government then sought to persuade the global community via the UN Security Council and “phone calls to many capitals” of the gravity of the charges.

Such fanfare went beyond the service of prosecuting a single crime. More likely, the charges being leveled at Iran came in the service of “public diplomacy” – an attempt to establish a broad narrative that serves a policy decision.

While pushing the narrative of an Iranian “bogeyman” is not unusual in US policy circles, what may be new is the urgent emphasis on this storyline in the aftermath of Arab uprisings throughout the Middle East.

Bring in the “Red Team”

In March, as the Arab Revolts swept through the Middle East and North Africa, the US military’s combatant command center (CENTCOM) for military operations in twenty countries – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Jordan – held a “Red Team” exercise to examine a narrative that perpetually pits Arabs and Iranians against each other.

CENTCOM’s Red Team was formed in 2006 to “think outside the box, offer contrarian thinking…sharpen the reasoning and force intellectual rigor” on critical issues for the benefit of senior military officials, a spokesman explained to me last year.

According to a source involved in the March drill, these are some of the specific premises and questions included in CENTCOM’s “Arabs versus Iran” exercise: (Note: The Red Team refers to Iranians as “Persians”)

• Premise: “The Arab-Persian dynamic is a divide.  History, religion, language and culture simply pose too many obstacles to overcome.”
• Premise: “A general Arab inferiority complex relative to Persians means that many Arabs are fearful of Persian expansion and hegemony throughout the Middle East.  In their minds, the Persian Empire has never gone away and it is more self-sufficient than most Arab states.”
•  Premise: “Barring a “clash of civilizations” – i.e., a modern crusades, Islam vs Judeo-Christians, warfare between the West/Israel vs Arabs/Persians – there does not appear to be a scenario where Arabs and Persians will join forces against the US/West.”
•  Question: “Is it appropriate to frame the discussion as Arab-Persian or is Sunni-Shia a more appropriate framework?”
•  Question: “Assuming a schism, what could unite Arabs and Persians, even temporarily?”

These narratives assume two things: that the division between Iranians and Arabs is a fact and that the greater unity of the two groups in the wake of the Arab uprisings is a potential threat to U.S. interests. Hence the worried question:  What could unite them, even temporarily?

Does the goal then become to ensure a state of chronic hostility between Iranians and Arabs?

Spokesman Maj. T.G. Taylor told Salon that CENTCOM planners “postulate multiple scenarios and potential outcomes to better anticipate and understand the nature of a complex and diverse region.  It is through this prudent military planning and cultural research that we are able to evaluate how to best protect U.S. and partner interests while reducing the risk of miscalculation stemming from ethnic and national differences.”

There is no disputing the region is rife with fault lines that divide populations.  I call the three biggest the Stink Bombs of the Middle East: Sunni versus Shia, Arabs versus Iran, Islamists versus secularists.  While there may be some natural tension between these groups, since the 1979 Iranian revolution there has been a marked increase in narratives that create fear of Shiites, Iranians and Islamists for geopolitical advantage.  And U.S. allies in the region — Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen — have been at the forefront of these efforts.

“… is Sunni-Shia a more appropriate framework? Arabs are afraid of Persian hegemony …  Islam vs Judeo-Christians …”

Such  themes have been embedded in superficial narratives of the Middle East that recur in our media.  The Red Team exercise was not particularly exceptional in many respects. But two things are highly unusual about this drill: the timing and its sponsor. The question baffles: Why did the U.S. military decide to shine a spotlight on the Arabs vs. Iran narrative three months into the uprisings sweeping through the Arab world?

Why not a broader, more urgent evaluation of how to realign U.S. interests with emerging democratic actors in the region?

The balance of power shifts

At the time of the Red Team exercise, peaceful, political protest had swept away pro-American regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and reached a critical mass in Bahrain and Yemen. The former is home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet. The latter is an operational center for al-Qaida and a recent proxy battleground for Saudi-Iranian tensions.

Viewing the Arab uprisings through an Iranian lens offered a possible advantage for the United States. Arab public polls consistently favor Iran when it is contrasted with the United States, but not nearly as much when it is compared to other Arab regimes, even unpopular ones.  This tendency has long provided opponents of Iran to sow discord in the Arab world– even before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but especially afterward. Narratives about expansionist, aggressive aspirations of the Iranian Shia have been sown far and wide in the largely Saudi-controlled Arab media, even though there has not been a serious conflict between Iranians and Arabs since the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988.

A testimony to the power of propaganda and the knowledge deficit it encourages, mistrust between Iran and many Arab nations has simmered on low boil ever since. As Washington seeks to manage its losses and assert some control over future developments in the region, this narrative tool becomes a cost-effective way to wrest back some of its primacy by defining a new Middle East and drawing others into those  assumptions.

The Pentagon is actively seeking to understand, influence and control these platforms and the messages they transmit. In July, the technology arm of the Department of Defense, DARPA, announced a $42 million program to enable the U.S. military to “detect, classify, measure and track the formation, development and spread of ideas and concepts (memes)” within social media.

Manufacturing narratives

Promoting the narrative that casts Iran as a regional threat to Arab nations serves several urgent interests today: It justifies the upcoming sale of more than $120 billion in weapons to Arab governments, and works toward preventing Iran from gaining a further foothold in Iraq once U.S. troops complete their withdrawal in December.

But the Arab uprisings have interfered with Washington’s story. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main rival and the U.S’s closest Arab ally, has sent troops into Bahrain to violently quell protests, has offered sanctuary to embattled dictators and is subsidizing many of the remaining autocratic Arab regimes throughout the region.

Counter-revolutionary Saudi Arabia’s substantial treasury insures its perspective will be heard in Washington. The Saudis will pay for more than half — $67 billion — of the total value of the region’s controversial arms purchases. The monarchy is also developing an elite 35,000-man force to “protect the kingdom’s oil riches and future nuclear sites,” to be overseen by none other than CENTCOM.

The Arab revolts pose a threat to such business. In recent months, the Obama administration has been hard-pressed to gain approval for even a mere $53 million slice of its weapons sale to Bahrain, which has been censured internationally for its suppression of peaceful protests.  Withstanding pressures from Congress and human rights groups, a State Department official last week finally announced the approval of the sale.

As these Arab uprisings continue to dismantle the regional status quo – for better or for worse – it appears the United States is acting not in accordance with its declared values, but is instead allowing financial and hegemonic calculations to drive foreign policy. Narratives manufactured to support myopic interests over fundamental values cast a long shadow over our ability to play a leading role in global affairs.  We don’t reason, we spin.  And, in the case of this newly vulnerable Middle East, nobody is more proficient in the business of keeping conflict humming.
This article was first published at Salon.com

I have been staring incredulously at my TV screen these past few hours as the story of Iran’s alleged assassination attempt of a Saudi diplomat in Washington unfolds in dramatic increments.

Reporters keep repeating the theme “like out of a Hollywood script” as they eke out increasingly unlikely details about this “terror” plot.

My immediate thoughts? Ah. So this is how Washington intends to overrule objections to its $120 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Arab dictatorships of the Persian Gulf.

Forget Hollywood. If I channeled the worst of Washington’s Mideast policymakers, past and present – say, a John Bolton and a Dennis Ross – I could have written this story myself. A modern-day Wag the Dog if you will – the 1997 Dustin Hoffman/Robert De Niro black comedy in which a Hollywood producer helps Washington fabricate a war-on-celluloid in order to divert attention from a presidential sex scandal.

It so happens that I am in the midst of writing a revealing piece about a US military effort to test narratives about what unites and divides Arabs and Iranians. (Watch my blog for this in the next few days)

The most interesting aspect of this military-sponsored exercise is the timing – it took place less than three months after the onset of the Arab revolts that swept the Mideast.

Very quickly after the uprisings began, it became obvious that Iran stood to gain a geopolitical advantage if pro-US despots fell and Arab populations turned against the status quo which has long favored Washington goals: Israeli regional hegemony, unfettered access to cheap oil, the marginalization of political Islam…and now, the sale of hundreds of billions of dollars of weapons to the US’s remaining autocratic allies.

It also very quickly became apparent that selling the $120 billion worth of armaments – half of which are intended for the Saudis (Saudi Arabia: $67 billion, UAE: $35-40 billion, Oman: $12 billion, Kuwait: $7 billion) – to repressive regimes was going to be extremely difficult in the face of our public stances on democracy and human rights.

Weapons sales would be particularly hard to defend in the case of Saudi Arabia, by far the most repressive regime in the wider Middle East and North Africa, and ironically, America’s closest Arab ally.

Saudi Arabia’s position in the region today is so poor that it holds the distinction of being labeled the “Counter-revolution” state for its aggressive attempts to roll back these popular revolts. The Saudis spirited away to safety Tunisian dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali after his ousting, fought with Washington over its dwindling support of Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak, rolled troops into Bahrain to violently quell protests, poured money into the coffers of corrupt monarchs from Jordan to Morocco, and are backing the immensely unpopular Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh against all odds.

So, how could the US fulfill those previously-approved weapon sales to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf-Cooperation Council (GCC) autocracies without taking a global bashing?

Easy stuff: manufacture an “Iranian” threat and make the image-challenged Saudis look like victims desperately in need of protection.

Washington excels at divide-and-rule narratives, and leads its Mideast allies in sowing discord between Shia and Sunni, Arabs and Iranians and Islamists and secularists. Our favourite bogeyman bar none is the “Iranian, Shiite, Islamist” one, and we parade it around to great effect when we need an extra card to bulldoze through any reasoned policy challenges.

This “news” story on the alleged Iranian plot to kill a Saudi official is no different. But let’s collectively decide to scrutinize this one in a way we never did with the Iraq WMD allegations or the yellowcake uranium fabrication.

Tonight I found myself anticipating details of the case before the news anchor had even announced them. Where would Ross-Bolton, I thought, go with this story? The ideal scenario would be to create narratives quickly and decisively and flood the media marketplace with those impressions.

The goal: 1) to swing popular Arab opinion away from Iran and its allies, thereby influencing the direction of the Arab Revolts, and 2) to stack domestic and international opinion in favor of the pending US arms deals.

Ross-Bolton would have thoroughly approved of the details of this assassination plot. Firstly, it takes place in the United States and not the logistically-simpler Middle East, which provides rational cover for Washington to lead a new international jihad against the Iranians.

Secondly, it features the bizarre Mexico connection, an immediately obvious attempt to draw in Hezbollah, which we allege is involved in “terrorist” operations and drug smuggling south of our border – when actually, we are just trying to find a way to halt financial contributions from wealthy Lebanese-origin Latin Americans to Hezbollah, a group that also offers widespread social services to many Lebanese civilians – hospitals, schools, infrastructure and the like. US policymakers must be exceedingly frustrated that nobody actually buys these stories – Israel, Canada, the US and the Netherlands are still the only nations to categorize the Lebanese resistance group as a terrorist organization.

And finally, a Ross-Bolton personal touch: the assassination plot apparently also includes discussion of blowing up the Israeli embassy in Washington, gaining both sympathy points for the Jewish state at a time when it is becoming a pariah, and ensuring that the mindlessly pro-Israel US Congress will jump on board any and all efforts to nail the Iranians and reward the Saudis.

No questions asked.

Anyway, do enjoy the drama and keep an eye on how this spins out. Prepare for those “difficult” arms sales to breeze through. I will shortly publish my piece on the US military’s efforts to shine a spotlight on Arab-Iranian divisions – I think it will provide the requisite backdrop to explain why we find ourselves watching Hollywood at the top of the news hour today.

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Typing away the truth?

I recently spoke with a friend who has been in and around Washington’s Mideast foreign policy establishment for three decades. “I have never seen policymakers so confused,” this political insider told me in regard to US plans in the region.

The old paradigms of supporting Israel unconditionally, marginalizing political Islam and propping up dictators we whitewash as “moderates” do not hold when the region is experiencing such fundamental shifts. Especially when our policies were such dismal failures before the Arab Awakening even hit our television screens.

So it is disheartening to see so many analysts, reporters and commentators still transfixed with old narratives – none of which serve to encourage the innovative policy reassessments needed to deal with this spanking new world.

Two recent examples:

Plumbing New Depths in Support of Israel
“In 2003, France and Germany’s decision not to allow coalition troops to use their territory in the effort to depose Saddam Hussein in Iraq not only was a blow to their alliance with the US, but set in motion circumstances that ultimately helped create the insurgency.”

For the record, I don’t blame France and Germany for jumpstarting a legitimate insurgency against occupying US forces. But Jonathan S. Tobin, writing in Commentary last week, did just that. Except, instead of invoking France and Germany – also close US allies who refused to participate in our misguided Iraqi adventure – Tobin was writing about “Turkey.”

Sounds just as stupid with “Turkey” in there, now doesn’t it?

The backdrop to Tobin’s bizarre conclusion is the recent emergence of a more assertive Turkey on the global stage, which – like other emerging powers – gently nudged aside the United States from its post-Cold War role as the sole arbiter of All Things. While Washington remained cautiously watchful of Turkey’s new direction, all attempts at diplomatic neutrality came to a screeching halt when Ankara dared to criticize Israel for its brutal assault on the Gaza Strip in 2009 and for its 2010 killing of nine activists on the Turkish-origin Mavi Marmara flotilla ship headed for Gaza.

As the war of words escalated between the two countries, our no-space-between-us-and-Israel clause in The Contract kicked in and we got nasty. Washington pundits began to question Turkey’s strategic importance to the US and started dropping the dreaded “Islamist” moniker in all references to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP-led government. Punishing Turkey took many forms – including approving in committee a contentious congressional resolution declaring the 1915 Armenian massacre a “genocide” and boycotting the 2010 Anatolian Eagle military exercises with the longtime NATO ally.

Turkey gained a brief reprieve when the Arab Awakening swept through the Middle East and Ankara became an important Muslim ally in ushering through support for NATO air cover of Libya and challenging the Syrian government’s treatment of protestors. Turkey threw its NATO allies a further bone by agreeing to host a US-allocated early warning radar on its soil as part of a plan to deter ballistic missile threats.

But new hostilities between Turkey and an ever-intractable Israel threaten to once again light a fire under the Jewish state’s supporters in the United States. Ignoring Ankara’s vast strategic value to Washington, commentators like Tobin are grasping at straws to once more strike some blows against Israel’s latest nemesis.

A NATO member since 1952; the world’s 16th largest economy; second largest standing armed force in NATO with over one million soldiers; a founding member of the United Nations, OECD and the G-20 major economies…

Just imagine – Turkey being blamed for Iraq’s insurgency. Wow…just wow.

Sadly, this is the kind of extrapolation in political reasoning that has made this truly a mad, mad, mad world. Welcome to punditry in Washington, DC.

Rehashing Old Stories To Reinforce a New Narrative
Then from out of the blue comes this Christian Science Monitor headline: “A Stunning Shift of Iran’s Image in the Arab World.” The article, which summarizes the results of a 2011 poll by Zogby International, points out that the Arab perception of Iran has taken a massive tumble in the last year.

Except that this is a story that made the rounds two months ago – most major papers carried this news in some form in July. Why dredge up the poll results as a headliner in September?

Both Washington and Tehran are maneouvering hard to position the shifting Mideast landscape as favorable to their respective regional agendas. Iranians maintain that the ousting of mostly pro-US dictators will bolster popular resistance to American machinations in the region – scoring points for the Islamic Republic, which is widely viewed as leading that charge. The US claims that the opposite is true, particularly if the Syrian regime falls and removes a vital Arab ally from the Iranian sphere of influence.

From a wholly American perspective, this “Iran vs Arabs” narrative is essential to distract newly-liberated Arab populations from the fact that their dictatorships were partly made-in-America – and actual poll numbers supporting this rhetoric are pure manna from the heavens.

The Iran vs Arabs narrative (and its offshoot, Shia vs Sunni) is so valuable to Washington that the US Military “Red Teamed” this very subject shortly after Arabs began ousting their dictators.

But let’s take a look at what has NOT been reported about this golden survey. At the bottom of its summary of findings, the poll clearly offers up a disclaimer:

Note: In previous polls, when Arabs were asked questions about Iran or its nuclear program, and the U.S. and its threats of sanctions or military action were a part of the question, Arabs would indicate strong support for Iran and its defiance on nuclear issues. The more negative attitudes toward Iran reflected here may be accounted for by the fact that in this survey Arabs are being asked to state their attitudes toward Iran without reference to the U.S. and/or that Iran’s regional behavior has succeeded in alienating Arab opinion.

That’s a huge “and/or” right there. The very same pollsters in 2010 conducted a survey concluding that Arabs overwhelmingly supported Iran’s nuclear program, even if it was not for peaceful purposes. The difference lies in the framing of the question:

In 2010, the poll asked: “There is international pressure for Iran to curtail its nuclear program. What is your opinion?” Respondents had a choice between “Iran has a right to its nuclear program” or “Iran should be pressured to stop its nuclear program.” Seventy-seven percent voted in favor of the former, with only 20% opting to nix nukes.

The critical language here is that the question is framed in the context of “international pressure.” Arabs are overwhelmingly rejecting this foreign intervention, rather than necessarily advocating on Iran’s behalf. In the 2011 poll, however, there was no reference to external meddling, and the questions were set up to produce a rather obvious response:

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?

Statement A. “The Middle East would be safer if it were a nuclear free zone.”
Statement B. “The Middle East would be safer if Iran were a nuclear power.”

Cough, cough.

Media reports of this “stunning” 2011 poll fail to observe that respondents — all of whom come from countries whose governments are strongly allied with the U.S. (Lebanon excluded) – overwhelmingly favour Iran over the United States in the single survey question that allows a comparison.

Now that detail may have been relevant.

Who is at Fault? The Media or us?
These two examples represent a infinitesimal slice of the US media’s daily infractions in covering the Middle East. Both news reports and commentary pieces prove unreliable sources of information because of the lack of nuanced reporting from the region and a tendency to cleave to Washington’s highly-politicized narratives.

US policies, therefore, rarely get challenged in any meaningful way. Even after glaring failures like the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, nuclear negotiations with Iran, false WMD intelligence about Iraq, an unsuccessful “War on Terror,” etc., US MediaBots faithfully report from the perspective of the same misguided American politicians and special interest groups.

I’m often warned about “getting too deep into the weeds” in my commentary and analysis of Middle East geopolitics. Translation: too much detail about events so far away will turn off American readers. Sadly, this kind of thinking only encourages our preference to explain the region through “soundbites” – albeit only those that fit our limited frames of reference.

I think Washington prefers it this way. And most of us are too lazy to question the premise, let alone demand some answers.

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